Prashant's home
Suber's home
Rahul's Home
Suraj store
gaya tri dbuilding
Pratiksha's home
Hospital
chaccki
Ramesh General store
chicken shope
home
Plpe line ->
way to mhada
home
bhat tree
Peepul tree
Playground
Buddha-vihar
Play ground
vegetable Shope
home
botje
Toilet
home

The City Produced

Urban Development, Violence and
Spatial Justice in Mumbai

Amita Bhide

RE-IMAGINING FUTURES
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
Cover image courtesy: Subir Shaman Acharya; Prashant Gopal Mokale; Purva Dewoolkar

The City Produced

Acknowledgements

Preface

Mumbai was a sparsely inhabited group of islands till 1661. Its transformation to a bustling city and thereafter to a premier commercial centre of the country with links to the global economy is a history that spans just over three centuries. In this time, the city has been made and remade several times. However, while some things have changed through these transformations, several other continuities remain. Mumbai is a city of contrasts. It is a city that defies linear narratives; a city that is considered a 'problem' in multiple ways (in terms of scale, efficiency, sustainability, justice, management) and is yet a 'functional' city. It is a city that produces multiple exclusions, but also fuels the dream of a constantly widening hinterland. It is a city that has relatively low levels of crime in public places, but embeds multiple forms of violence. Currently, the city's future is being speculated along the lines of Shanghai or Singapore; although the city is increasingly being seen as at risk, and increasingly unable to withstand competition even in the national arena. Moreover, these risks while being aggravated by virtue of its global status, are also linked to the deepening cleavages in the city's fabric—a threat to its 'city-ness' itself.

This reflection on the city's trajectory of socio-spatial transformations is organized around a few concepts that also provide the framework for more detailed case studies that analyse contemporary urban transformations. These concepts reflect contemporary concerns, and help build a commensurate historical backdrop against which we can better understand the transformations Mumbai is experiencing today. The brief sketch of the framework below, with key concepts in italics, indicates the logic of the historical narrative to follow.

At its core, this is a critical account of *socio-spatial transformations* that the city has undergone over its historical journey, especially in the last 150 years or so. The transformation of a littoral landscape with fishing and agriculture dependent villages, to an urban trading centre of national importance, is analysed simultaneously in social, economic, political, ecological, and spatial terms. Particular attention has been paid to the way in which the state and the market (or, specific actors, institutions, and groups that may be identified with either of these broad concepts at each moment) have shaped the socio-spatial transformations of the city at different times. Neither of the two formations has been ascribed an arbitrary value or purposive orientation in advance of assembling the historical account from secondary literature. This is meant to let the 'facts' suggest such values and orientations as rigorously as possible, within the limits of historical reflection based on secondary sources.

As it happens, the changing nature of the relationship between the two influential formations—the *state-market axis*—is the key analytical pivot on which the story of transformation turns. The transformations are

not assumed to be either naturally just, or benign. The account clearly reveals that they are usually guided by the interests, values, and objectives of specific powerful formations. These include, at different times, varying configurations of actors embedded in the colonial or postcolonial state, particular sections of society with political weight, or business and market interests in every period. The transformations also come at a cost borne directly or indirectly by particular social groups, while others benefit disproportionately. This aspect of the narrative calls attention to structural *inequalities*, as well as to their relationship with *poverty* and *vulnerability*—that both shape urban transformation and are sustained by it at each historical moment.

Among other things, the account signals the different kinds of *violences* that have been experienced by various landscapes, people, and places in the course of various transformations. These *violences* can be both instruments and outcomes of urban transformations. They can also be, in Slavoj Zizek's formulation, 'subjective' (caused by persons) or 'objective' (caused by larger structures or systems), and may be physical, social, or even economic experiences (Zizek, 2008). Questions about who experiences what kind of violence, who directs the transformations, and who reaps their benefits, naturally lead us to a consideration of the *spatial (in)justices* that have accompanied Mumbai's urban development, and continue to do so. Alongside a broad conception of development related *violences*, the concept of *spatial (in)justice* is an important anchor for the larger set of enquiries that form part of the current project. "There is always a relevant spatial dimension to justice", says Soja (2010) in his pioneering *Seeking Spatial Justice*, "while at the same time all geographies have expressions of justice and injustice built into them". In particular, the lens of *spatial (in)justice* allows us to identify patterns in the distribution of spatial costs and burdens that may be routine, invisible, and enduring, and may even be revealed as forms of violence. Given that in the last couple of decades Mumbai (and its metropolitan region) has seen both dramatic socio-spatial restructuring and vigorous resistance to it, a historical overview framed in this manner may be of value.

This paper is a chronological narrative of the socio-spatial transformations experienced by the city under various regimes—the colonial, the post-independence, and the contemporary. It seeks to understand how a colonial city became a city of dreams for several, and contradictorily, how the contemporary city that celebrates a global future and increased inclusiveness remains deeply splintered in character.

Contents

Table of Figures

List of Tables

Abbreviations

ADR	–	Accommodation Development Rights
AR	–	Accommodation Reservation
BIR	–	Bombay Industrial Relations Act
BIT	–	Bombay Improvement Trust
BKC	–	BandraKurla Complex
BMC	–	Bombay Municipal Corporation
CBO	–	Community based organisation
CDP	–	City Development Plan
CIDCO	–	City and Industrial Development Corporation
CSIT	–	Chhatrapati Shivaji International Terminal
EWS	–	Economically Weaker Section
GDP	–	Gross Domestic Product
FDI	–	Foreign Direct Investment
GSDP	–	Gross State Domestic Product
HDR	–	Human Development Report
ICT	–	Information and Communication Technology
IT	–	Information Technology
ITES	–	Information Technology Enabled Services
JNNURM	–	Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission
MHADA	–	Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Authority
MCGM	–	Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai
MLA	–	Member of Legislative Assembly

MMR	–	Mumbai Metropolitan Region
MMRDA	–	Mumbai Metropolitan Region Development Authority
MTSU	–	Mumbai Transformation Support Unit
MRVC	–	Mumbai Rail Vikas Corporation
MTHL	–	Mumbai Trans Harbour Link
MUIP	–	Mumbai Urban Infrastructure Project
MUTP	–	Mumbai Urban Transportation Project
OBC	–	Other Backward Classes
OCG	–	Organised Crime Group
NGO	–	Non-Governmental Organisation
PIL	–	Public Interest Litigation
RMMS	–	Rashtriya Mazdoor Mills Sabha
SEZ	–	Special Economic Zone
SGNP	–	Sanjay Gandhi National Park
SRA	–	Slum Rehabilitation Authority
SRS	–	Slum Rehabilitation Scheme
TDR	–	Transferable Development Right
TISCO	–	Tata Iron and Steel Company
ULCRA	–	Urban Land Ceiling Regulation Act, 1976
UDRI	–	Urban Design Research Institute
UNODC	–	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes
VT	–	Victoria Terminus

The City Produced

Urban Development, Violence and
Spatial Justice in Mumbai

Colonial Bombay: 1661- 1947

1. Colonial Bombay[1]: 1661-1947

Making of a city

Unlike other colonial cities in India like Kolkata or Delhi, Mumbai did not emerge as a seat of power. Its beginnings as a city were rather humble, and right till 1788 were questions about the viability of investment in the city raised. In the late seventeenth century, there were several competing trading centres and ports. Within the neighbouring geography, the Portuguese and Dutch already had strongholds over centres along the Konkan[2] coast like Thane, Kalyan, and Panvel. The nearby areas of Surat, Bhiwandi, Cambay, and Ahmedabad were thriving centres of trade. Although the British carried out trade operations from Surat, it did not suit their political needs because of the constant clashes between the Mughals and the Marathas, which created instability in the region (Farooqui, 1996).

Dabhol and Rajapur were also selected by the British in the seventeenth century as trading centres. However, gaining total control over any one place proved futile until Bombay was officially handed in dowry in 1661 by the Portuguese to Charles II of England. Within two years of its acquisition, the British moved their headquarters from Surat to Bombay to escape trade supervision and custom duties imposed by Mughals, with an idea to develop it as a harbour and ship building centre. Although Bombay was a natural harbour, it was not free from problems. Adverse climatic conditions, huge tracts of marshy land, large areas of rocky, barren land

Figure 1: Bombay, 1919

Source: Charles Morris, Winston's Cumulative Encyclopaedia Vol 2 (Philadelphia, PA: The John C. Winston Company, 1919) table 1. Map Credit: Courtesy the private collection of Roy Winkelman

(which made agriculture unfeasible), along with the scarcity of water made it extremely difficult for company officials to survive (Kosambi, 1985). Bombay didn't have a local trading community or any infrastructure such as a port. Bombay was also physically cut off from its geographical hinterland by the Sahyadri Mountains and the Deccan Plateau. Additionally, the Peshwas and the Mughals continually kept clashing in the area, thus making it unamenable to the British colonial agenda (Farooqui, 1996).

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[1] Bombay was officially changed to Mumbai in 1995 by the right wing Nationalist party, Shiv Sena, when it came to power.

[2] The Konkan coast is the section of India's western coastal region starting from Thane in Maharashtra and extending to South Kanara in Karnataka.

Figure 2: Bombay Fort 1771-1864

BOMBAY FORT
1771—1864
Scale 1200 Feet to an Inch

Source: The Rise of Bombay, A retrospect;
S.M.Ewardes, Pg. 215

Bombay's rise coincided with the decline of the Mughal Empire and the Peshwa's Court in the eighteenth century. In 1730, the company built its own navy, termed 'Bombay Marine', to protect and supervise the coastal front.

By the second half of the eighteenth century, the company started acquiring nearby areas, which not only provided food, timber, and protection, but also control over production sites and trade. Fortunately for them, the new British Company had also been amalgamated with the East India Company, thus providing even fewer opportunities for disruption and discord to this grand empire building project. The British, however, started consolidating forces and fortifying the city at the cost of the development of the surrounding towns. This implied, in some ways, that Bombay had lived out and in fact, subverted its destiny as a satellite town (to Surat) and was now being 'constructed' as a re-envisioned centre, through which other adjacent towns would be both reduced in importance and yet continue to grow. It also paralleled the establishment and consolidation of the British Empire in India.

The first large scale infrastructure development undertaken by the Company was the construction of the Bombay Castle, which was initiated in 1715 and was known as Bombay Fort (Kosambi, 1988). Bombay Fort was the nucleus of the colonial settlement and development near the shore (Kosambi& Brush, 1988 and Hazareesingh, 2001). The initial economy of the city was focused around the port. The already existent raw cotton trade had been going through its highs and lows. Earlier, cotton and some Malabari spices constituted the main export items of the region. In exchange, Britain shipped some woollens and metals to the islands. Along with improving trade and commerce, the company also started investing and building administrative infrastructure like courts and banks. By the 1780s, the East India Company had taken on the new role of ruler that was also interested in developing the town in a methodical manner, and had begun providing efficient infrastructure (Dwivedi and Mehrotra, 1995). The harbour was strengthened, the shipyard modernised, and the city fortified.

In 1784, Bombay received a major trading boost with an increase in cotton trade with China, but this was not sufficient for the survival of colonial Bombay. It grew very slowly and the resultant revenue could not support its rapidly increasing infrastructure. In 1788, Lord Cornwallis noted that the Company was spending a vast amount of money to maintain Bombay, and recommended its demotion to the position of a small factory (Farooqui, 2012).

Figure 3: **Mill Location Map**

Source:KRVIA design Cell & Charles Correa - 1996 - Report of the study group on the cotton textile mills in Mumbai Pg 1.

In 1820, Bombay's fortune changed with the advent of opium trade. Bombay became a hub for opium trade. In order to counter the Portuguese, the British encouraged private traders to stop by in Bombay while on their way to China. The revenue from this fed in to the development of infrastructure in Bombay, and financially strengthened the colonial government. With most of Gujarat's trade traffic now diverted to Bombay, and China opening up its markets to India, the British pumped returns from these traditional sectors into the Chinese tea and opium trade, which bought in revenue. The British further strengthened their control over local and colonial money markets and pushed the Portuguese currency out of circulation, while minting their own 'Bombay rupees' in the area. They also started investing actively into linking the islands, reclaiming land, and strengthening an urban front that would eventually turn into the city as we know it today. As Jairus Banaji (2013) has noted in his paper, "Opium was India's largest export item for most of the nineteenth century, her chief source of the large annual inflows of bullion from China, and the one commodity more than any other that financed a substantial part of the United Kingdom's trade deficit". Underlying this economic rise was also an experiment in social engineering. The British encouraged the in-migration of mercantile communities to Bombay. Elite Parsi bankers, merchants, artisans, and labourers were invited to come and settle in Bombay, and were provided incentives including promise of religious freedom and protection to merchants and ship owners from pirates (Dossal, 2010). Navsari master weavers were brought in from Gujarat. A mass exodus of drought-ridden people from the Konkan and Deccan moved to the 'centre' in 1803, generating a labouring class for the business houses that were set up.

The city economy transitioned from being a centre of trade to an industrial city in the mid-nineteenth century. In 1836, the Bombay Chamber of Commerce, which included several Indian firms, was founded. Additionally, the British Empire lost its main source of raw cotton as a result of the American Civil War. This resulted in an increase in demand for raw Indian cotton. In 1854, the first cotton mill was established in Bombay. This added 75 million pounds to Bombay's economy, which led to the growth of several financial institutions and created a speculative market. In 1875, the cotton trade increased with the construction of Sassoon dock. The establishment of the cotton mills was less a structural transformation of the Indian economy, and more "a defensive measure to spread the risks in view of the growing stranglehold of European firms in Trade" (Prakash, 2010: 41).

In the 1850s, the railways began to connect Bombay with the cotton growing areas of the Bombay Deccan, thereby contributing to the rise of the mills in the city. The number of mills rapidly multiplied from 1 in 1854 to 28 in 1875, employing over 13000 workers. The next two decade saw a rapid development of cotton mills with 70 mills employing nearly 59139 employees (Upadhyay, 1990). By the end of 1925, there were 82 mills employing 1.48[3] lakh workers. In 1872, as per the first Census of India, Bombay emerged as a leading urban centre with a population of 644,405, and was hence known as "Urbsprima in Indis" (Kosambi, 1985). It was the biggest urban centre of the Indian subcontinent and second in the world, after London (ibid). By the early twentieth century, the city's population was nearly a million, of which only a quarter had been born in the city (Prakash, 2010).

The rise in the number of mills was accompanied by the rapid expansion of a secondary economy of the street, which was geared towards servicing the material needs of mill workers. This secondary economy was not only the source of employment, housing, and credit, but also catered to the sexual needs of predominately male migrants who had left their families behind in villages (Kidambi, 2008). This resulted in a proletarian casual economy and a public culture centred on the street, which encompassed ramshackle lodging houses, liquor shops, brothels, pawnshops, and sundry unregulated activities (ibid).

Colonial cities are often said to perform the function of economic 'gateways'. However, Bombay did not just serve as a commercial and financial junction between a vast hinterland and the capitalist world economy, but also the locus of a major cotton textile industry that was founded and dominated by Indian entrepreneurship (Kidambi,2007). On the other hand, this pre-eminence of Bombay was at the cost of a national economy and resources, which were devalued through the terms of trade. This character of Bombay, that is, the relative autonomy of its economy from colonial interests and the pre-eminence of indigenous elite, distinguished it from other colonial cities.

Chandavarkar (2009) opines that a reason for this was that British power established itself late and slowly in Western India. Its finances were weak and as a result, led to considerable dependence on Indian merchants and dubashes. The Parsis invited from Gujarat were the natural allies of the British state. The opium trade had benefitted several entrepreneurs, largely Parsis. They also became the beneficiaries in the process of the expansion of the city's territories. Parsis were not the only group involved in these negotiated relationships of economy and political control. The groups also included the Hindu and Muslim gentry.

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[3] One lakh is equal to 100,000

A divided city

The city began to develop in a spatial pattern that reflected the 'racism' of the colonisers embedded in the 'purity and pollution' based separation of the city. Thus, a fortified wall initially divided the settlement into parts comprising the European sector to the south of the wall, and the crowded Indian sector to the north. With its streets lined with thatched dwellings, this northern part was also known as the 'Native town' or 'black town' (Kosambi, 1988). Even within the walled area, the area was divided with the Europeans in the south and the Indian mercantile community towards the north. A similar pattern of spatial segregation continued during the later development of Bombay through the twentieth century.

Figure 4: **Spatial segregation, Bombay**

Source: Three Colonial Port Cities in India, MeeraKosambi and John E. Brush, Geographical Review, Vol. 78, No. 1 (Jan., 1988), Pg. 32-47

More privileged communities occupied the 'safer' hill areas, the middle classes stayed in the Girgaon area wedged between the hills and the docks, while the labouring classes stayed in the low lying docklands that were vulnerable to malaria. With the rise of the mills, the owners were encouraged to construct housing for the workers which took the form of 'chawls'[4] concentrated in the Girangaon area. Bombay was a city that was spatially segregated, but the dense intermix of geography meant that these segregations were a matter of relative positioning, as everyday life necessitated interaction with other communities and spaces. Thus, there emerged a strong development of mixed land use settlements (Tindall, 1992).

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[4] A chawl refers to two or three storied residential tenements, with each floor consisting of row of single or double rooms sharing a common balcony. Chawls were built by both the colonial government and the private landlords as cheap housing for low-wage migrant workers who would not have been able to pay high rents in the city. These were not just buildings but the social life of the city.

Producing order and control: The state in Bombay

The making of Bombay actively involved the national elites and the colonial rulers. The relationship between the two was not always collaborative, and involved attempts to bypass and usurp each other (Farooqui, 1996) through lobbying and petitioning (for instance, against land acquisitions and for representation in local government), but also involved acts of philanthropy (such as creation of public institutions such as hospitals, libraries, as well as infrastructure like wells and roads). The relationship between the state and the indigenous elite thus followed a complex trajectory within an overall framework dominated by the colonial agenda. As the city evolved in its systems, institutions and, other instruments of order, this alliance between the state and the elite took multiple forms and promoted mutual interests.

One of the best examples of this is the creation of a land administration system for the city. Dossal (2010) shows how the British used cadastral surveys(1811-27, 1865-72) as a way of exerting their own control over land (via eminent domain and land acquisition), but simultaneously perpetuated a regime of private property rights that benefitted Parsis and English literate locals who emerged as the biggest land owners in the city. In this process, other occupancies and cultivating claimants were bypassed due to their illiteracy and lack of access to information and procedures set up under foreign legal systems.

Another important site for this alliance-building was the Bombay Municipal Corporation (BMC). By the late 1830s, the elite had acquired a significant share of local power and in 1880s they won the right to represent in the newly formed Municipal Corporation. However, institution-building also encompassed the inception of schools, the Bombay University, banks, stock exchange, and so on. These institutions were often partisan. The BMC for example, extended voting rights to propertied interests alone, excluding the vast majority of workers and labourers who lived on rent. The elite focused on the city where they had influence, and used it as the base to expand their provincial interests, largely ignoring the hinterland.

A consistent investment in the city infrastructure was high on the agenda of this alliance. Initially, the onus of infrastructure building was with the British, who brought in their agendas and technology. Such initial projects included the building of docks and the harbour, and the construction of the Fort, the mint, and the joining of islands. However, soon, this gave way to collaborative projects. As Chopra (2011) shows, several Indian philanthropists shaped the landscape of colonial Bombay. This includes social infrastructure such as wells, hospitals, schools, and orphanages, as well as basic infrastructure such as roads (for example, Lady Jamshetji Road), causeways, and railways (for examples, Nana Shankarseth contributed land for the city).

This alliance helped to create an aura of a city that was orderly, peaceful and had well-heeled institutions, infrastructure, and governance. In the words of Chandavarkar (1994)—

> "...civic pride was manifested in rhetoric, philanthropy and in a measure of commitment (of elite) to the working of the institutions of urban government. Of course, their benevolence was often selective, their rhetoric was often disciplined by their parsimony and their best intentions were qualified by harsher calculations of particular interests. Nonetheless, this civic ideology served to ensure a certain minimum in standards of governance and in public expectations about the city's institutions." (p. 186)

According to Chandravarkar (1994), in Bombay, modernity seemed to exist amidst poverty and underdevelopment. The areas where the labouring classes lived were, by and large, the low lying central districts wherein infrastructure was abysmal. Much of the soil in the low-lying central districts of the city remained permanently waterlogged and liable to be permeated by disease microbes, creating a favourable ecology for the spread of malaria and plague. Overcrowded and unsanitary buildings threatened the lives of their occupants, and facilitated the spread of diseases. The BMC expanded the city's water supply; this was not matched by the construction of a comprehensive drainage system, leaving the vast majority of localities north of the Fort without adequate drains or sewers. By the turn of the century, a new city had indeed come into being, but one that was marked by environmental degradation, human poverty, and health pandemics.

In 1896, a devastating plague epidemic hit the city of Bombay, triggering panic among the colonial officials, the commercial elite, and Bombay mill owners (Arnold, 2012). More than 500,000 of the city's inhabitants, including approximately 20 to 30 per cent of its mill workers, fled the city, crippling Bombay's commercial and industrial activities including the operation of cotton mills. Between 1897 and 1899, the plague claimed 44,984 victims (5.8 per cent of the city's population, according to the 1901 census). The city's terrible housing conditions facilitated the spread of the disease, and death rates in working-class neighbourhoods climbed as high as 12.5 per cent (ibid). The inadequate sanitary conditions in the dwellings inhabited by the poor were perceived as a primary cause for the spread of the epidemic in the city. Finding solutions to the problems of overcrowding and unsanitary housing became matters of critical importance if Bombay was to continue fulfilling the required functions of the imperial agenda (Kidamdi 2001).

In 1898, the Bombay Improvement Trust (BIT) was set up with the express intention of clearing the city of its unsanitary areas and mitigating the problems caused by the abysmal living conditions of the urban poor. The primary strategy for overcoming congestion was through slum eradication. However, the BIT's rapid clearing of slums was not matched by the construction of affordable homes, thereby enabling landlords to step in and simply continue their practice of erecting the most hazardous and unhealthy buildings to accommodate the urban poor. By 1909, the BIT had evicted over 50,000 people from demolished one-room tenements, but its new sanitary chawls only contained 2,844 rooms (Hazareesingh 2001). While the BIT's policies served to whet the appetite of rentier interests with resources to invest in the land market, they had an adverse impact on the city's poor (Kidambi 2001). This massive displacement that served elite interests, was the outcome of an outwardly social policy; setting a pattern which was to be repeated in the postcolonial period with greater sophistication.

By the end of the First World War, the housing situation of Bombay's labouring classes had attained crisis proportions. In July 1919, it was reported that out of a population of 1,200,000, nearly 892,000 resided in one-room tenements and that there was a shortfall of 64,000 tenements in the city (ibid). This resulted in spiralling of land values and rents, alongside low wages. The response of the colonial state to these shortages and exclusions was to set up new institutions like the Bombay Development Department which undertook public housing on a rental basis, and to introduce of town planning schemes. Further, mill owners were encouraged to construct housing for workers in the vicinity of the mills. These responses were inadequate for the overall demand and theme of housing shortage—in particular of the labouring classes who were then left to their own devices. Inadequate housing amidst spiralling land and housing values has remained a theme that has dominated the city from this period to the contemporary one, with new dynamics being added to the rentier forces and to exclusions.

The city's planning history is replete with instances of such violence of the state. Besides housing, there were several other dimensions to the exclusion of the poor. These included the shifting of small and informal industries such as tanneries and breweries to the periphery of the city, as they were 'polluting and hazardous', the suppression of activities like prostitution and gambling, and the labelling of beggary as a crime. Using the twin instruments of law and planning, the colonial state frequently purged undesirable activities and people to the periphery of the city.

The police system formed a key component of maintenance of this 'order'. Modelled after the armed forces including the hierarchy and the command system, the police system in India and in Bombay in particular was designed to protect the establishment, and lacked accountability to the people. Dhillon (1998) points out that the Bombay Police Act of 1881 scrupulously avoids any mention of people, excepting their liability to be questioned or to be held under suspicion. He further stresses that a combination of feudal and colonial understandings of power meant that the police were seen only in terms of their policing role, while the potential abuse of power was ignored. As a result, since their institution in 1856, the police became aggressive practitioners of authority, often brazen in their exercise of power.

Excluded from formal citizenship and denied adequate compensation, the city's poor resorted to developing their own social networks which catered to their multiple needs. A strong secondary economy thus prevailed on Bombay's streets. In these areas, a parallel culture of power and influence emerged. This culture was partly embedded in the traditional power structures of communities, and partly in the multiple needs of migrants in the new city space, thus giving rise to informal networks of patronage. These new focal points of authority and influence included jobbers, rent-collectors, local landlords, Pathan money-lenders, the proprietors of taverns and tea-shops, brothels, gymnasia, and street-bosses of various kinds commonly known as 'dadas'. Kidambi (2004) points out that these people were, on one hand, being used as instruments of peace keeping and control by the colonial administration, while on the other hand, their increasing influence was also being seen as a source of anxiety.

These complex interconnections between two parallel worlds of the elite and the poor, of the propertied and street, and 'worlds of cash and capital', spanned across neighbourhoods and distinct ethnic, regional origins, and contributed to the peace in the public realm. As a result, the city acquired a distinct, fairly secular public culture. Chandavarkar (1994) points out that this was due to the fact that no single social group dominated the city's social and political life. Parsis were the city's leading property owners and entrepreneurs, but constituted only 5 per cent of the population. Hindus constituted two-thirds of the population, but were divided into multiple groups. Muslims too constituted a significant 20 per cent, but were also divided into sects. Bombay, thus, emerged as a site where the colonial state was compelled to engage in a process of negotiated political alliances that cut through several communities on several key issues—a culture of governance distinct from other Indian cities; a culture where class and wealth overpowered caste and religion.

A city of protest

There are contesting views on the relatively peaceful ethos of Bombay as a city. One view states that peace in the city is fragile, rests on injustice, and is produced through the violence of the state and the market acting in collusion; while other views maintain that the city indeed has a legacy of a secular public culture, and that it coexists with contestations and protests in the public realm. What is undeniable is that since the colonial period the city of Bombay has had low

levels of crime, and the experience of public life is arguably safe. There are also few instances of serious riots in the history of the city. Its early history records several small and localised instances of riots, largely involving Parsis and Muslims. One of the first recorded Hindu-Muslim riots was in August 1893, when ferocious rioting broke in Bombay between groups of Hindu and Muslims. According to official estimates, 80 people were killed and 530 wounded in the violence. Over 1500 were arrested by the police on grounds of 'unlawful assembly' (Upadhya, 1989). The three days of rioting, the Bombay Gazette declared, had been "made memorable in local history by the destruction of temples and of mosques, and the looting of shops, to the accompaniment of fierce faction fights in the streets, varied with senseless assaults on the police and the military" (Kidambi, 2004: 29-30). These riots led to a gradual expansion of the police system in the city. Overall, however, riots remained an anathema to the city.

On the other hand, the city began to acquire fame as a site of resistance. In 1908, the imprisonment of B.G. Tilak evoked the first large scale demonstrations in the city. Since then, as industrial capital began to get well-entrenched in the city, protest became a more familiar phenomenon. Heuze (2011) argues that from the perspective of the natives, the city had a 'tejas' or a dynamic and sacred energy that animated life and protests were a critical part of the same. Till 1914, most of the strikes in the mills were confined to a department or a mill. But between the World Wars, that is, between 1919 and 1940, the industry witnessed eight general strikes, all of which lasted for at least a month; some continued for considerably longer periods. The general strike of 1928 began officially in April after several mills had experienced extended strikes over the previous six months, and ended favourably for the workers in October. During the 1928 strike, a group of communists emerged as the dominant force on the strike committee. They formed the GirniKamgar Union which, despite continued depression, dominated the labour movement in Bombay throughout the period. The rise of the mills and the labour movement had a lot of spin-offs in the public culture of the city. This was the era when Bombay emerged as one of the epicentres of the anticolonial struggle and the labour movement (Chandravarkar, 1994). The Indian People's Theatre, the anti-caste cultural movement, flourished in this atmosphere. It strengthened the ethos of secularism, and contributed to a culture that celebrated public expression of protest. As the Indian independence movement accelerated with the launch of the Quit India Movement and the naval mutiny, the struggles on the street provided an avenue for representing the claims of the sections that had earlier been excluded from all formal institutions and mechanisms of the city.

Bombay at a crossroads

At the eve of independence, Bombay was a city poised at a critical juncture. Its institutional legacy was rooted in collaborative governance between the indigenous elite with a narrow social and class base, but who were guided, nevertheless, by the spirit of public good. Would the emerging political elite be able to implement this spirit of public good, or continue to serve particular interests? What emerged was a functional city at the core in terms of public services and infrastructure, characterised, however, by severe inequality and discrimination, which were largely neglected or relegated to the background. This strategy of governing in parts was to come under severe challenge with the limits placed on geographical expansion of Bombay in the postcolonial period. The other critical crossroad was related to the relationship between the colonial state and Indian capitalists. The city had come into existence through an active alliance between these two interests, but it became increasingly strained between the 1920s and 1930s, with enhanced taxation and Indian capitalists beginning to invest in import-substitution industries which threatened colonial interests. These developments tilted the local elite positively towards the anticolonial struggle.

Simultaneously, the labourers and the hitherto ignored sections participated actively in the independence struggle, and developed positive expectations of a new national government free from colonial rule.

What route would the nation take? As a city with enormous potential in terms of its strong economy and large population (about 1,800,000), would Bombay—the city that drew the hinterland—offer these hitherto neglected sections a more just arrangement ? What would national independence from a colonial regime mean for the city?

Post-Colonial Period: 1947 to 1980

2. Post-Colonial Period: 1947-1980

Dreams, continuity, and change in the nation and the city

Independence brought in democracy; it also represented a new vision for a nation state that was 'constructed' in the colonial era, and had to face the challenge of often conflicting expectations of diverse communities and interests. This was a phase that saw certain reorientations of state-market-society relationships, but also represented significant continuity. The postcolonial Indian state witnessed a transfer of political power from the British to the Indian National Congress party,which would dominate the Indian political landscape for the next two decades. The Congress attempted to realise 'its tryst with destiny' by establishing a framework wherein the Planning Commission played a strong role toward realising the vision of democratic socialism. The Congress regime represented a coalition of interests that incorporated political competition and consociational arrangements within its boundaries held together by a delicate balance of factions (Yadav, 1997). The coalition included sections of middle class, dominant caste, elites, landlords, and members of professional bodies. The interests of all these dominant elites were satisfied at different levels of the political system (ibid). Another element of continuity was the structure of the State. The colonial regime had created a state apparatus that was repressive and excessive in relation to the underdeveloped and poor condition of the economy (Evans, 1989). The new government chose not to create an alternative state structure, and instead retained the military, police, civil services, and other institutions which were formed originally to extract resources from India.

The political economy that took shape in the years after independence gave rise to a developmental state that spoke of 'high modernism' and aspired to be a 'command economy', where the public sector had a substantive presence and several key sectors of economy were 'nationalised'. The State essentially controlled the inflow of capital, products, and technology; it partitioned the public and private sectors, and private capital was to be controlled by a system of industrial licensing. In the end of the 1960s, J.R.D. Tata observed the following in his annual speech as chair of Tata Iron and Steel Company (TISCO)—"In the last 20 years, the freedom of operation and scope of action of the private sector have been subjected to a gradual but continuous process of erosion in the course of which the government has established a measure of control over the means of production and distribution which is

Figure 5: Master plan for Greater Bombay with land allocation and road system, 1948.

Source: Marriam Dossal, theatre of conflict, city of hope Mumbai.

unprecedented in any country other than in totalitarian rule". This state constantly evoked the developmental project, which was equated with high modernism comprising big structures and sites of development and progress, but had to be transacted at the local level by powerbrokers who had 'feet of vernacular clay' (Kaviraj 1988).

New, planned capital cities were a key aspect of this vision of high modernism. The urban bias of the centralised vision of Nehru-Mahalonobis planning has been critiqued by farmer leaders like Charan Singh, who were in favour of greater investment in agriculture and off-farm employment (Corbridge and Jones, 2010). This urban bias operated as an unacknowledged spatial preference of investment, but often did not translate into planning and infrastructure building in cities that were to be the recipients of these investments. Development of Bombay in the post-independence years is particularly illustrative of the contradictions in the above situation.

Figure 6: **Extended boundaries of Bombay; suburbs which extended to current limits of Mumbai by 1957.**

Source: Marriam Dossal, theater of conflict, city of hope Mumbai

Bombay, the commercial centre of colonial rule, was the epicentre of the evolution of the postcolonial governance framework. One of the most well-known initiatives in this regard was the Bombay Plan authored by a group of Indian industrialists and technocrats in 1944 which was meant to be a 15 year investment plan for the country. The plan, which had well known industrialists such as G.D.Birla and J.R.D. Tata as its proponents, proposed a strategy to change the economy from a predominantly agricultural one, to one that had a strong share of industry as well as services. Towards this end, they proposed a centralised economic initiative funded through deficit financing and compulsory saving, that would focus on agriculture and consumption goods in the first five years, basic core industries in the next five years, and transport, and social services in the final five years (Sanyal, 2007). The Bombay Plan, which was a subject of public discourse in years preceding independence, significantly influenced the course of national planning in its initial years, although it was never publicly acknowledged and was gradually erased from public memory. The fate of the plan, in many ways, symbolises the nature of the tenuous coalition that the Congress had built with the patrons of industry on one hand, and those making radical demands for redistribution of land on the other. It gave preference to establishing political equality, but did not prioritise economic equality. This task was left to the later-day actions of the developmental state, whose benefits were to trickle down to the underprivileged, over a period of time.

Changing city politics and governance

The histories of urban local bodies predated that of provincial governments, which emerged only in 1935. The BMC, in particular, had an extremely rich legacy with one of the first municipal laws to have incorporated 'city makers' in its decision-making, and the creation of a strong local body with a fair degree of autonomy; although the bureaucracy was privileged since the Commissioner was afforded astatutory status. In the post-independence dispensation, urban development became a state subject, thereby making urban local bodies dependent on state governments following the principle of 'ultra vires' (instruments of the superior body). The state government tried to bring in a uniform pattern of administration, taxation, and financing, covering various municipal bodies in the province. Gradually, the independent decision-making and taxation powers of municipal bodies began to be curtailed, making them dependent on grants. Municipal bodies were subjected to arbitrary treatment and suspensions following political exigencies. The strong BMC act meant that it was not subjected to suspension.However, these changes had profound implications for the hitherto privileged space that BMC had acquired in terms of investment, as well as raising of resources, and as a primary institution that planned, implemented, and monitored projects for city development. Parallel institutions responsible for varied aspects of city development were created by the state government. This shift initiated an overlapping and competitive pattern of governance, which was only enhanced in the 1970s and thereafter.

Figure 7: **Ward Map Bombay: 1964.**

Source:http://premamilan.blogspot.in/2012/03/mumbai-ward-map.html

Simultaneously, a key shift was seen in the nature of representation and electoral politics. Bombay, which did not have an adult franchise in the colonial period, now had a corporation that was elected democratically through adult franchise. Partisanship of private property owners that would extend their power into the governance domain (which existed in the colonial era) was made a thing of the past. The elite and educated nature of representatives in the BMC began to change with local, vernacular elements beginning to appear on the basis of the strength of their community presence in the city.There was a shift in the nature of wider politics,which was now acquiring an inclusive tone with the aim to providejustice to areas and settlements such as slums and other unplanned spaces. This went against the grain of municipal law, which had regarded these spaces as encroachments that needed to be removed and controlled. Over

the years, the municipal corporation became a porous institution, at once open to political influence and the operation of local official—subject to political networks at the lower levels as well as to state level controls through higher bureaucratic levels. In the initial period after independence, trade unions became extremely important in industry as well as in city politics.Political representatives such as George Fernandes, Sadashiv Kanojiya Patil, and Comrade Dange, emerged as central figures in the city politics. The Congress attempted to counter the same by creating a centralised union in the textile industry. The Bombay Industrial Relations Act, (BIR Act1946) sought to establish a single, approved union that would renounce the option of strikes, and stress other means of resolution. The Congress-led Rashtriya Mazdoor Mills Sabha (RMMS) became the sole 'representative' union under the BIR Act, and made any legal strike impossible.This political shift in unions also made the state government much more powerful vis-a-vis local government.

The state government's incursions into the city took multiple forms—the setting up of institutions such as Mumbai Metropolitan Region Development Authority (MMRDA—which was responsible for regional development), and the Slum Improvement Board (as part of Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Authority—MHADA) which was responsible for the regulation of irrigation, the development of water sources, and control of electricity. Gradually, most large infrastructure development projects began to be controlled by units of the state government, while the functions of the BMC became reduced to maintenance and operations.

The triumph of the region: State versus the city

A new dynamic of the region trying to assert itself over the city took earnest shape in the 1960s with multidirectional developments. In the 1950s, the desire to domesticate cosmopolitan Bombay within a Marathi social and linguistic framework was strongly expressed. On 13 May 1946, a session of the Marathi literary conference held at Belgaum unanimously resolved to form a united Marathi state. Consequently, the Samyukta Maharashtra Parishad (United Maharashtra Conference) was formed on 28 September 1946, to unite all Marathi-speaking territories into a single political unit. The demand for a state of Maharashtra with Bombay as its capital found resonance not only among literary imageries but also within the working class of the city, which saw this move as an assertion of their identity in a city dominantly shaped by a multilingual elite. The States Reorganisation Committee, which had submitted its report to the Indian Government in 1955, had recommended a bilingual state for Maharashtra–Gujarat with Bombay as its capital. The Maharashtrians wanted Bombay as a part of Maharashtra, since it had majority of Marathi speakers.

However, the city's economic and political elite feared that Bombay would decline under a government committed to develop the rural hinterland (Hansen, 2001). The Bombay Citizens' Committee, an advocacy group composed of leading Gujarati industrialists, lobbied for Bombay's independent status. The turbulence of the next five years was reflected on several fronts—electoral, street struggles, and behind-the-scenes lobbying. On 1 May 1960, the region triumphed when the state of Bombay was reorganised on linguistic lines. The state of Maharashtra with Bombay as its capital, was formed with the merger of Marathi-speaking areas of state of Bombay, eight districts from the Central Provinces and Berar, five districts from the state of Hyderabad, and numerous princely states enclosed between them. Bombay was evidently the site as well as the key subject of contention.

Figure 8: Samyukta Maharashtra movement, 1946.

Source: http://memumbai.com/samyukt-maharashtra

With this, a new political dynamic emerged. The Gujarati and Marwari communities owned the majority of the industry and trade enterprises in the city, while the white-collar jobs were mainly sought by the South Indian migrants. The Samyukta Maharashtra struggle had created an overlap between region and labour politics. It took political shape in the form of the Shiv Sena, established by Bal Thackeray on 19 June 1966 owing to a feeling of resentment regarding the relative marginalization of Maharashtrians in Bombay. The Shiv Sena rallied against the South Indians, the Communists, the Gujarati city elite, and the Muslims in the city. In the 1960s and well into the 1970s, Shiv Sena cadres became involved in various attacks against South Indian communities, vandalising South Indian restaurants and pressuring employers to hire Marathis. Violence and intimidation was thus being used as strategies to create processes of 'othering' of people and places. The state-level politics was dominated by the Congress, while that at the street- and city-level was increasingly influenced by the Shiv Sena, which formally came into power only in 1985. This conflict between politics at the two levels and the increasing dominance of the state, continued to shape the socio-political as well as economic landscape of Bombay in the years to come.

State dominance affected the economy through industrial policy, in a bid to control private interests. The 1970s represented a high point for centralised, socialistic development at the national level. This was the period when banks were nationalised. Industrial policies advocated regional dispersal, and the licensing raj became strong. Commodities that could be produced by various scales of industries were regulated. Serious curbs were placed on private capital for the first time in post -independence India. In Bombay, another counter pressure to industrial growth was laid by the

regional plan of 1975, which advocated for the decongestion and deindustrialisation of the island city. Besides the constraints on industrial capital, strong curbs were laid on real-estate development as well. State intervention in markets for protection of public interest increasingly took the form of law. Thus, apart from the Rent Control Act which had been in place since 1949, the Urban Land Ceiling Act was introduced in 1976 (these are dealt in detail later). The politics of control of space thus emerged as an extremely critical aspect besides the politics of labour. With the onus of the implementation of these acts being on the state government, it began to control not just the labour economy and the infrastructure development of the city, but also the space economy.

In this developing paradigm of Maharashtra that placed priority on moving away from colonial imaginations that benefited city and elite, it was a region (Western Maharashtra) with its cooperative institutions and caste (Maratha) that became the new subject of development. The city became an entity that was to be controlled and restricted, as it was seen as the site of parochial politics.

Thus, apart from city development being increasingly subject to control by state government, the city occupied a fairly low priority in state politics. A contentious state and city relationship was thus emerging both in the economic realm in the form of state verses private interests, and in the realm of politics reflected in regional and city verses state politics.

A new twist to state-market relations

While in the colonial period a lot of power was concentrated within the city government, now there were multiple centres of power, and state-market relations became more complex. The political wing had become important, there were more institutions involved, and the decision making process had become procedural and subject to several checks. To add to the complexity, a constitutional commitment to socialism necessitated a populist front for taking key policy decisions.

Several key decisions, legislative as well as policy-related, were restrictive to the growth of industry and real estate development in the city. The Rent Control Act (1949) and the Urban Land Ceiling and Regulation Act (ULCRA) of 1976 cumulatively impacted the geographically constrained land and housing market of the city and its outskirts. Policies that sought to control industrial expansion in the city adversely impacted the growth of new industry. While the city represented a convergence of resources, it was also characterised by high costs of land and labour.

On the other hand, none of these acts and policies had been implemented in their true spirit. The state government of Maharashtra, for example, could barely acquire 104.69 hectares of land, and applied only 79.36 hectares for public good out of 1271.47 hectares of land identified as excess (Bhide, forthcoming). State institutions and their interactions with private actors, thus acquired certain key characteristics such as opaque rules, non-transparent procedures, fragmented information, overlapping and multiple jurisdictions, high degree of centralisation, and an overemphasis on procedure rather than outcome. In the context of housing and land markets Rajack et al. (2013) opine that these are a product of a dynamic interaction of actors around a regulatory and policy framework that includes significant discretionary spaces or areas of ambiguity, and which is only weakly enforced by public agencies who in addition to often themselves being actors, typically have limited implementation capacity (Rajack, Pethe, Peter & Shrikant, 2013). This observation can be extended to multiple arenas of state policy.

State-market alliance in the postcolonial period functioned through these complex and twisted spaces. In order to make the system work, these discretionary spaces had to be tapped through networks, and thus the cultivation of networks that would link porous spaces at multiple scales and allow the furtherance of mutual interests became extremely critical. In this political economy, large-scale, planned developments became difficult. In the case of Mumbai, Navi Mumbai stands out as a lone example of a large-scale, planned, satellite town development in the midst of developments taken over by large capital interests in nexus with political elements, (for example, Nariman Point and Backbay development) and other informally developed towns such as Vasai Virar, Kalyana, and Dombivili.

A city restrained?

Bombay continued to remain an economic powerhouse in the years after independence, till the 1970s. Economic growth in India was relatively strong during much of the 1950s, and employment growth in Bombay was particularly good, as the city's manufacturing sector diversified. Thus, engineering, pharmaceutical, and chemical industries also expanded rapidly in the city and its outskirts, in addition to textile industries. As the state government became more powerful, Bombay became the space that housed many of the new institutions such as City and Industrial Development Corporation (CIDCO), MHADA, and so on, and became a significant source of employment. By 1981, the share of the industrial sector in employment was 44per cent, while that of services was 54 per cent (Mumbai Human Development Report, 2009).

In the 1960s, government policies at the central and state level were highly discouraging of industrialisation and the concomitant population and geographical expansion of Bombay. Old plants were refused permission to expand, and with an increase in population within the city, industries, especially polluting industries, were forced to move to the outskirts of the city. The overall policy of tight government control on licensing and permits began to impact the economy in various ways. One outcome of these policies was the emergence of a different scale of industry, one much smaller than the composite Fordist production seen in several parts of the world. Various small- and medium-size industries flourished in the towns along the two rail routes—Central and Western—in close proximity of the city. These towns included Ambernath, Badlapur, Kalyan, Dombivali, Palghar, and Dahanu.

In relation to the region however, Bombay seemed to be an oasis of prosperity. Thus, while the Gross State Domestic Product (GSDP) of the state of Maharashtra was Rs.13729.67 crores[5], the GSDP of the city was Rs. 4759.93 crores with a share of over 30 per cent.

The 1961 census, showed that the share of organised sector employment in the city was 65 per cent and main workers constituted 40 per cent of the work force. But by 1981, the proportion of main workers had declined to 35 per cent, indicating that conditions of work had become uncertain.

The dependency ratio (that is, ratio of non-workers in a family to earning members) increased from 1.4 in 1961 to 1.8 in 1981, indicating that the number of dependents had increased, and that earning members were able to release other household members from labour. The work situation was thus becoming complex. Nijman (2012) states that Bombay's class structure prior to the 1970s is best described as bottom-heavy, dominated by the poor masses, among whom the industrial workers were marginally better off. The middle-class was very small, and consisted mainly of people with secure and better paying jobs in the public sector. The upper-class was smaller still, comprising the

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[5] One crore is equal to 10,000,000

political and economic elites. Bombay attracted a constant inflow of migrants in search of opportunities. By the 1980s, the city had earned a reputation that a person who was willing to struggle could make it there.

Changing demographics: A city nationalised

The British had incentivised migrants from business communities in Gujarat to settle in Bombay. The city had grown in population even in the colonial era. Yet, the annual growth in population was about 2.51 per cent at its highest between 1931 and 1941. Given that the natural growth rate of the city has been around 2 per cent, it seems that mobility to the city was fairly restricted. Independence seems to have released the gates of restricted mobility, with a continuation of the trend of high in-migration, till recent years. The aftermath of partition in 1947 and the birth of Pakistan saw hundreds of thousands of refugees arriving in Bombay, and the city's multi-ethnic population grew and diversified further. (See table below) The density increased from 6841 persons per sq km in 1951 to 18833 persons per sq km in 1981(Mumbai Human Development Report 2009).

Migration and the rise of population commensurate with it, has been a consistent challenge to the city and its governance in the post- independence era. The initial years after independence saw a huge influx of refugees; the decade of 1941-51 thus saw one of the largest increases in population experienced by the city at nearly 50 per cent. The next three decades were also characterised by high levels of migration to the city, mostly from Maharashtra (40 per cent), Uttar Pradesh (14 per cent) and Gujarat (13 per cent). Within Maharashtra too, a bulk of the poor migrants were from the rural areas of Ratnagiri, Raigad, Pune, and Satara (Singh, 2007).

Table 1 Population of Bombay		
Year	Population	Annual Increase (%)
1941	1801356	-
1951	2994444	4.98
1961	4152056	3.24
1971	5970575	3.59
1981	8243405	3.20
Source: Census, 2001		

Source: The Times of India Mumbai, Sep 21, 2007, Section: Times City; Page: 4

In the seventies, recurring droughts in the region enhanced the population growth of the city to over 4 per cent per annum, bringing in a largely poor, Dalit population which began housing itself through informal arrangements, thus creating informal housing solutions in the face of lack of adequate formal housing. Simultaneously, a city region was also being created through the emergence of commuter settlements around the Central and Western Railway. Thane, Kalyan-Dombivali, and Ambernath on the central side and Vasai-Virar, and Bhayender on the western side emerged as centres of unplanned metropolitan growth. This development highlights the crucial role of public infrastructure and services in shaping a city by connecting its people and places, facilitating access to employment, and affording people spaces to claim and make the city truly theirs.

Geography: Reaching the limit ?

The country's partition in 1947 brought many people to Bombay, and spaces were being carved to accommodate them. A special township—Ulhasnagar—was developed near Kalyan to settle the refugees. However, while such refugee camps were being setup in the periphery of the city, the city itself became fixed in its geography.

In 1955, the city was last expanded to include parts of the Thane district and the island of Salsette; its boundaries extended till Dahisar, Mulund, and Mankhurd. This marked the last extension of the corporation's limits. The extended BMC now abuts other municipal bodies on all its Northern edges, thus giving no room for further expansion. The demographic pressure on the city of Bombay, whose geographical expansion was curbed, has been multiplying since 1955 due to both natural increase, as well as inflow of migrants.

The railway routes emerged as the city's lifeline and thereby became the axes for the emergent spatial geography. Town planning schemes that were instituted during the late colonial era and public housing schemes that took root in the

post-independence era became catalysts for new settlement development. The Western part of Bombay emerged as the more preferred residential area due to its proximity to the beach and the presence of hills, while the Eastern part that was low lying and less habitable became home to industries and polluting activities. The working class stayed in the Eastern part, mostly in order to stay close to their place of work, and also to offset high transport costs. The ethnic, class, and caste segregation, which was visible in the colonial era, continued in postcolonial Bombay. Gujaratis, Banias, Bhatias, and Jains occupied areas like Kalbadevi, Bhuleshwar, Ghatkoper, and Borivali, while Parsi and European elites continued to congregate in the Southern tips of the city.Muslims were at Mohammad Ali Road, Bhendi Bazaar, Abdul Rehman Street, and Kurla, the Maharashtrian working class at Girgaum, Thakurdwar and Parel, Tamils at Matunga, and the Dalits in Wadala, Kurla, and Chembur and so on (Prakash, 2010). Thus, while certain unifying forces such as the railways did provide means to connect people and places, at the same time, the historical legacies, socio-spatialities, and the wider economic and political structures continued to divide the city along lines of income, identity, and occupation, through violent and non-violent means.

Slums: At the edge of the postcolonial space — livelihood political economy

Figure 10: Dharavi's location with respect to city's growth

Slums made an entry into the housing profile of the city in the post colonial period. The colonial city of Bombay registered a very small proportion of slums,that is, less than 5 per cent (Sharma, R. and Narender, 1996),although inadequate housing was significant in the city. The primary strategy of the colonial government was to push undesirable developments to the periphery, as was done in the case of tanneries in the beginning of the twentieth century like in the case of Dharavi. The post-independence era opened the gates to migration and put an end to the city's ability to push these 'problems' to the periphery. The slum population in the city thus began to increase. The population living in slums was reported to be around 12 per cent at the time of the 1961 census (ibid). Dharavi, with an area of 330 acres, emerged as the largest slum in the city.

While the legal meaning of slum focused on inadequate, overcrowded housing and lack of infrastructure, in reality, the meaning of slum that evolved in Mumbai was encroachment and settlement on lands that were considered undesirable and often dangerous for residence, such as pavements, areas adjoining railway tracks, areas under high tension electricity wires, mountain slopes, and marshy lands. Most of these were public lands. A new dimension was added to this definition after the passing of the ULCRA, when a significant number of small to medium land owners encouraged slums to be developed on their lands (Narayanan, 2003). The state viewed slums as an

outcome of uncontrolled migration. A.R. Desai (1970) examined slums through a Marxist lens—as settlements that housed cheap labour, the cost being borne by neither the state nor the employers. Slums represented an obvious spatial inequity, occupying less than 6 per cent of the land of the city (Das and Gonsalves, 1987). For many who settled in slums, these came to be places of hope; a means to access the city with its opportunities and resources, and an escape from the distress of caste ridden and disaster prone villages (Panwalkar,1984). Concomitant with the entry of slums, was the emergence of the informal economy. This was understood to be a transitory sector comprising tiny, often family-based enterprises, which engaged unskilled and low educated workers in their initial encounters with the city.

The initial policy response to slums was a continuation of the past policy of clearance. In fact, an act, the Slum Clearance Act, was passed to that effect in 1956, which viewed slums through the lens of public health and morality, and found them to be a threat toboth (Gilbert, 2007). However, in 1972, the official policy towards slums changed from clearance to 'improvement'. The act facilitated the notification of slums on private as well as public lands and authorised state intervention in the form of provision of public amenities, such as common water taps, toilets, drains, and street lights. A city-wide slum census was conducted in 1972, and photo-passes were issued to all the households residing in these areas. A separate state agency—the Slum Improvement Board—was established for slum improvement, and was merged with the MHADA. Over a period of time, corporators and members of legislative assembly (MLAs) of the state were allotted a certain amount of funds to be spent on the development of slums in their constituencies. These funds, which were later extended to members of parliament as well, have emerged as one of the more substantive sources of amenity development in slums. However, this approach of State to improve and develop slums by providing basic servicesintroduced another contradiction in the governance of the city. Variously described in other contexts as 'political society' (Chatterjee, 2004) and dual city (Busch, 1996); the impact of these developments was particularly significant in Mumbai due to the scale of the developments. Chatterjee (2004) points out that the urban poor were not given any rights at par with other urban citizens, but were treated merely as a category of population. These policies then reinforced existing inequities, marginalisations, and divisions, between people and places. The urban poor were thus compelled to engage as a political society, as active groups which organised, negotiated, and contested with the establishment, using political channels, violent means, or peaceful protests, thus creating differentiated access to urban spaces and services. A new politics of planned and unplanned spaces, and inclusion and exclusion of the urban poor and working classes, was thus emerging in the city (Pendse, 1995).

Violence, peace and protest: The Bombay spirit takes shape

It was in this period from independence to the 1980s that several of the unique characteristics associated with Mumbai as a city began taking shape. In Appadurai's (2000) words,

> "...Well into the seventies, in spite of phenomenal growth in its population and increasing strain on its infrastructure, Bombay remained a civic model for India. Most people with jobs had housing; most basic services (such as gas, electricity, water, and milk) reliably reached the salaried middle classes. The laboring classes had reasonably secure occupational niches. The truly destitute were always there, but even they fit into a complex sub-economy of pavement dwelling, rag picking, petty crime, and charity." (p. 628)

This was definitely not a city without contestations, conflicts, or inequities. Protests constantly found new fertile ground. Protests ranged from organised strikes of the mighty trade unions' struggles against evictions, to protests against price rise, and tothose to conserve democracy. Bombay, as Dalits from the surrounding regions began to find refuge in the city's slums, also became a space that was at once restricted to particular occupations and spaces, as well as a mobilisational space for the expression of Dalit identity (Rao, 2000). Struggle and protest became forms of agitation as well as symbolic of strength and resistance. Such protests often entailed violent means employed by the state as well as the people.

This was also a period when new actors emerged as mobilisers. So far, the scene had been dominated by trade unions. As the alliance between political parties and trade unions strengthened, non-party political organisations and voluntary organisations which engaged with community organizations, began to emerge as well. These organizations mobilised hitherto unreached sections of the population, and articulated their demands in front of the State(Kothari, 1989).Such mobilisations developed around slum evictions, as well as around constituencies like labouring women, nomadic and denotified tribes,and so on. New instruments that strengthened the culture of protest were also developed. One such instrument was the Public Interest Litigation (PIL), which was a legal instrument that enabled intermediaries to file cases on behalf of disadvantaged sections of people. During 1970-1980, the PIL emerged as a mode by which courts expanded the realm of justice to include multiple components of human rights, and gave operational meaning to certain dimensions of the non-justiciable directive principles of the Constitution. This had particular significance for groups of people like slum dwellers, unprotected workers, and groups in need of state support, whose rights and entitlements were not clear.

While on one hand, the city was experiencing enhanced people's resistance and efforts towards claiming the city, an empire of organised crime was simultaneously taking shape also with the purpose of claiming and controlling the city. The underworld in Bombay began to emerge with the prevalence of the smuggling activities that started soon after independence. It comprised petty criminals who were involved in illegal activities. However, after the prohibition on import and export of gold and silver in the country, the smuggling activities in the city proliferated. The gang leaders involved in these activities soon gained a lot of support from the communities due to the flamboyant lifestyles that they exhibited and the networks with poor communities that they established. According to Raghavan (2012) membership in the gangs was mediated by lower-middle or lower classes and lower castes or minorities. Haji Mastan and Yusuf Patel began as small-scale criminals, and later took to smuggling gold and silver (Sumita and Tiwari, 2001). These were people who had international and local connections, people who could address grievances, people who could give quick loans, and people who generally helped people out without getting involved in complicated legal circuits. Criminal elements thus began to fulfil those roles and responsibilities that the State had failed to perform.

The members of the underworld made a lot of money and invested it in 'legitimate' business ventures, primarily construction. A classic example is that of Varada. In the 1950s, when prohibition of liquor was introduced in the city, slums became the sites which were used to manufacture illegal liquor. Varadarajan Mudaliar, who started as a porter at the Victoria Terminus (VT) railway station, took to committing theft at the Bombay docks and later graduated to bootlegging in the 1960s. Varadarajan represented the city's first experience with organised crime. Varada's empire was founded on bootlegging and 'matka'[6], and later expanded to smuggling and contract killing (Zaidi, 2012). He organised these activities within a system that embedded poor settlers, for whom he became a saviour, providing work and hearth,to Dharavi. There was a complex nexus between the police machinery and the underworld, which provided for trade and manufacture in this illicit business. In the mid-1980s, Varada became so influential that he

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[6] Matka is a form of gambling or lottery which started in Bombay in 1960s.

[7] Local term for conclaves

would hold 'durbars'[7], in his area of influence to settle disputes (Sumita and Tiwari, 2001).

Then came a time when gangs were employed by the textile mill owners to break up the efficient functioning of the unions. Gangs of determined persons, usually from specific gymnasia in the city, were often employed by employers and anti-strike 'official or recognised' unions, to protect strike breakers as they entered the mills, defy pickets to criminally intimidate strikers, disrupt meetings of strike leaders, and assault activists and leaders of the striking workers. Traditionally, such activities were most common in the textile industry, and the concerned strikes were usually industry-wide,and carried serious social and political implications. The stakes, hence, were very high. Recruitment of criminals to intimidate belligerent unions and unionists was not unknown in other industrial establishments either. This had to necessarily be an organised activity, given the required numbers and the needed coordination of criminals. Some of the leaders of such gymnasia-based gangs later became recognised political activists, and at times even occupied elected posts at the local level. The maintenance of 'troops', always ready and professionally devoted to these activities, itself gave these groups a criminal character, whether they were involved in any other infringement of the law or not. There is enough evidence to suggest that they were involved at the minimum in the extortion and collection of 'protection money' from a variety of business persons(Raghavan, 2012). Perpetrators of crime and violence thus performed multiple roles both for state and non-state actors, such as the community, as well as the market. While criminal elements provided many services meant to be provided by the State to people in return for support, they also provided services to the State when it met with resistance it needed to contain and control. Further, violence could be seen as a process as well as a product that not only produced inequalities, but which was produced as a result of these inequalities themselves. During this entire period, Bombay was considered a safe city. Daily life was increasingly becoming strenuous with expanding commuting lines and strain on infrastructure. The poor felt this stress the most, as they coped with highly uncertain existence and restricted rights and entitlements. Yet, the gaps between people were not very high. Everyone largely used common infrastructure such as public transportation systems, schools, and hospitals, and the objects of consumer interest were limited. The city was thus a fairly inclusive city that 'accommodated and made do'. Rao (2007) in her discussion of the sociology of densities argues that the threat of mobocracy is ever present in the dense everyday experience of the city. However, the literature on Bombay reveals a highly socialised crowd that plays a functional role, that is, the maintenance and production of order. The social ecology created by the density and the constant presence of people on the street shape what has been popularly heralded as the 'spirit of Bombay'—the ability to carry on and help each other. This spirit can be seen as a way to produce order and function in the context of a city characterised by an absence of an 'effective city state'. The Bombay spirit that comprised levelling, cosmopolitanism, carrying on in adversity, and collectively coping, advanced the 'security in the public realm' experience of the colonial city.

The Period of Transition: 1980-2000

3.The Period of Transition: 1980-2000

Transition into the New Economic Policy

The 1980s signalled a period of uncertain and unstable politics in the country. It was a period where alliance politics took shape, there was a rise of regional politics and the country saw several changes in national level leadership marked by short tenures. It was also a period dominated by majoritarian communal politics that saw its high point in the destruction of the Babri Masjid in 1992. At the state level, this was a period that witnessed the rising importance of urban to state politics. In 1997, the Shiv Sena, a primarily city based party came to power at the state level, posing a grave threat to the traditional rural cooperative stronghold of the Congress.It was also a period marked by pro-business growth strategies (Kohli, 2006). The year 1991 signalled the formal launch of liberalisation policies in India. In response to a balance of payments crisis, the country launched a phase of initial reforms that significantly impacted licensing policies. This first phase of reforms was largely focused on economic policies. Its impact was seen in terms of the rise of the Information Technology (IT) industry, and socially in terms of a rising middle class.

At the city level, there was a decline of textile mills followed by the rise of the more profitable real estate industry. This transition was not a very straightforward one, and was marked by the involvement of the mafia and several violent transactions. This whole period was marked by violent encounters between the market and civil society, society and the mafia, and the state and civil society. It was against this backdrop that the city witnessed the worst disjuncture from cosmopolitanism in its history, in the form of communal riots that shook the city from December 1992 to January 1993. The time period from the 1980s to the start of 2000 saw a change in the city's name from Bombay to Mumbai, which represented a consolidation of regional identity, although its socio-demographic dynamics reflected different realities. The response of the elites was to set new trajectories of governance along with a renewed and vigorous attempt to overhaul the city's infrastructure. The partner of the elite was a changed middle class, which was upwardly mobile and aspirational.

This was also a period of the emergence of the metropolitan region. While the Mumbai Metropolitan Region officially came into existence in 1975 after the establishment of the Mumbai Metropolitan Region Development Authority (MMRDA), the towns in the vicinity of Mumbai had been experiencing exponential growth from the late 1960s. Singh (2007) observes that was a period of significant outmigration from the city, with more than half of the out-migrants in Bombay migrating to Thane district, as per the 1971 and 1981 census. By the 2001 census, more than two-thirds of outmigration from Mumbai was to the Thane district. Evidently, this could be attributed to the lack of affordability of housing in Mumbai, and the availability of relatively inexpensive homes in a series of unplanned residential developments along the suburban railway routes in places like Kalyan, Ulhasnagar, Ambernath, Bhayandar, Vasai, and Virar. This period saw the development of one planned satellite city in the form of Navi Mumbai, juxtaposed with many unplanned satellite towns like those mentioned above. This geographical expansion of the city was also a response to the aforementioned transformational events.

Decline of the manufacturing economy

The textile mill strike of 1982 was a defining moment in the economic history of Bombay, as it laid the ground for the closure of the textile mills, and the subsequent conversion from a manufacturing economy to a service economy. The crisis of the textile mills had a long history. The policy of subsidising khadi[8] and handloom as per the 1985 textile policy executed through the Cotton Textile Control Order (1948) changed the way the mills would function. The policy imposed a freeze on the capacity of the composite mills, and imposed differential excise on all cloth except handloom and yarn (excepting hank yarn which is used by the handloom sector) (Adarkar and Phatak, 2005). It introduced a licensing system for powerlooms but did not impose any limit on capacity; thus there were no restrictions in the loomage and spindlage in the composite mills. The sector that benefited the most from this was the powerloom sector, which utilised all the protection meant for the handloom sector and continued to proliferate. On their part, the mill owners did not modernise their machinery. Instead, funds from the textile industry were diverted to other industries like engineering and pharmaceuticals (Adarkar and Phatak, 2005). In this context, when textile workers went on strike under the leadership of DattaSamant (who had acquired the reputation of being a militant trade union leader in the engineering industry), there was a threat not just to the mill owners but also to the political establishment, which had nurtured the RMMS as a sole representative of the workers. The establishment was unable to break the strike, but it signaled the closure of the textile industry in the city. The 18 month long strike saw the workforce of the textile mills shrink from a huge 2.5 lakhs to 1 lakh (D'Monte, 1998). During the strike, the mill owners started outsourcing the production to the power looms in Bhiwandi(Adarkar and Phatak, 2005), where labor was much cheaper and the conditions of labor unregulated.

Changes in the regulatory structure of the transnational economy also influenced the decline of the textile industry in the city. Cumulatively, these changes made the land on which the mills were built a more valuable resource than the textile mills themselves, divesting a very large textile mill community of their rights to livelihoods and space in the city.

The impact of the closure of mills was extremely critical for the city, its economy, and its people. Not only did former mill workers resort to taking jobs in the unorganised sector, but they also started the process of outmigration from the city (Bhowmik and More, 2002). Many people returned to their villages, while some, according to records, were driven to suicide due to the loss of livelihood. Even after some mills reopened, the people who did regain employment were under great duress, and most eventually lost their jobs or took voluntary retirement. They had to resort to some form of informal labor in the unorganized sector, which however could not support the needs of their family, and pushed them further into debt (ibid). The economic hardships that these workers had faced during the years of the strike and the closure of the mills led them to restrict the education of their children in many cases, creating a generation that was low in skills (ibid), and could not be employed in the industry that emerged to replace the cotton textile mills of Bombay (Chandavarkar 2004).

The scenario of the textile mills was soon replicated in the engineering and pharmaceutical industries in the city. With the decline in manufacturing, real estate became the new driving force of the economy. The employment situation in Bombay underwent drastic changes in this period. By 1991, 65 per cent of the workforce was engaged in activities within the unorganised sector, while the organised sector engaged only 35 per cent of the workforce—a complete reversal of the 1961 scenario (MMRDA 1996). The fall in the proportion of employment in the organised sector was 8.9 per cent, per annum, during the period (Centre for Research Development, 1995). While the share of

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[8] Handspun and hand-woven cloth made with cotton, silk, or wool.

employment in the manufacturing sector declined, there was an increase in the employment share in the services and finance sectors. Between 1983 and 1993, the share of employment in both the service and financial sectors considerably increased. The employment in service sector share increased from 19.6 per cent to 25 per cent, while the finance sector's share rose from 7.6 per cent to 11.5 per cent (Bhowmik and More, 2002).

Although a substantive chunk of labour was always engaged in the informal economy in the city in the form of petty production and services for the organised sector and elite, by the end of the 1990s, most of Bombay's employment was sustained by the unorganised sector. Its nature was no longer 'informal', but 'unorganized' with active linkages to formal production. The two types of labour that had a predominant presence in the sector were contractual or casual labour seen in small scale industries, and self-employed labour in the form of street vendors, watchmen, and home-based workers (ibid). Both these forms of employment were characterised by irregular sources of employment, lack of social security, little regulation in the spaces of work, and the lack of any legal protection. This too facilitated the development of a new economy of space in the city.

Emergence of a new space economy

The housing problems in Mumbai had emerged since the latter part of the colonial period. This problem was linked to its restricted geography, the monopolistic land ownership patterns that were capable of sustained speculation, and excessive public regulation of land and housing markets. In this context, high levels of migration to the city were absorbed into unfriendly and inhospitable terrains, which were gradually converted into thriving settlements. Additionally, the city had a strong cooperative housing movement, through which a significant amount of housing units that catered to the salaried middle class with access to housing finance were created (Rao, 2012). The city of the elite also made plebeian dreams possible. Mumbai thus presented a picture of an accommodative city, where slums coexisted with the most affluent and central locations.

The decline of manufacturing led to an overemphasis on real estate. Liberalisation of the land regime became a priority for the ex- industrialists. However, these agendas were also political minefields. Liberalisation of land regimes, thus, took multiple forms that worked within the framework of the existing legislative and regulatory regime. One such form was the design of special schemes to bypass the ULCRA and Rent Control. Another critical policy intervention was the exemption of about 283 plots of land from Development Plan reservations in 1991. A lot of these plots were no development zones, or were under land ceiling. A master stroke was, however, the introduction of the notion of redevelopment, which was to address several forms of 'problem' housing such as slums, dilapidated buildings, old municipal colonies, chawls, and so on. Redevelopment enabled the perpetuation of the prevalent policy regime, while granting the real estate industry the 'space' it required to grow. These two decades saw much experimentation around how to make redevelopment possible. Three other ideas that were gradually added to this repertoire of growth strategies were free housing for slum dwellers (introduced in 1997), the Accommodation Development Right (ADR), and the Transferable Development Right (TDR). Ostensibly, a lot of these policies were justified as policies that were pro-poor, or for creation of affordable housing.

The land and housing market of the city, which had been severely impacted by the centralisation and socialisation policies, now witnessed a new dynamism. Slum redevelopment, in particular, was considered as one of the cheaper modes of obtaining TDR (as a form of spatial incentive that could be financialised), and used in the mainstream market. Trading of land under slums was no longer in the informal market. The returns from this space economy

were enormous in Mumbai, where formal housing was scarce.

These changes in the space economy brought about an important shift in the way the state conceptualised its role vis-a-vis land and housing markets. The private sector was now seen as having the prime onus of construction, while the state was to 'facilitate' the same. Even the objective of housing people in slums or in dilapidated buildings was to be achieved through public-private partnerships. This was a period for experimentation of these policies, as a successful model for the same had not yet evolved. The greatest impact of these changes was seen in public sector housing and cooperative housing. In the entire decade between 1990 to the turn of the millennium, MHADA could not build a single unit for the economically weaker section (EWS). Similarly, the concept of cooperative housing took a hit, and its proportion significantly dwindled (MMRDA, 1996). The lead in construction was now taken by an entity called the 'builder', who took charge of the entire construction process, and sold individual apartments to prospective owners. The emergence of the builder can be directly attributed to the growing complexity of managing the construction process, which entailed the procurement of land and approvals, arranging finance, and the necessity of maintaining networks that enabled these. Evidently, criminal elements that moved across the formal and informal places constituted a crucial element in the creation and nurturing of such networks. In the mid-1990s, Mumbai's large crime groups that had begun organising themselves globally, emerged alongside a broader set of actors like builders, planners, and so on, to gain greater influence in the property development industry (Weinstein, 2008). They used their deep connections with political parties and the local elite to overcome regulatory barriers, and find ways around the high land prices. The entire Mumbai metropolitan region could be seen to be divided into territories under the influence of various Organised Crime Groups (OCGs), each seeking to build their own empires (Sumita and Tiwari, 2002).

Riots and the destruction of the cosmopolitan fabric; its impact on people and places

Between December 1992 and January 1993, following the destruction of the Babri Masjid in Ayodhya, Bombay experienced serious communal riots, in which more than a thousand people were killed (Srikrishna, 1998). Not only did these riots fracture the cosmopolitan ethos of the city, they also strengthened the political weight of the Shiv Sena, which then grew to be a Hindu nationalist political party with increasing influence in the city's politics.

Unlike previous riots, this riot was dispersed and spread to relatively newly urbanised areas. Arson, killings, and the destruction of property occurred in different kinds of areas. Violence affected not only the slums, but also apartment blocks and chawls. "Nine hundred people died in the December and January riots and the causes included police firing, stabbing, arson, mob action and 'private firing'. The number of injured exceeded 2,036", reported the Srikrishna Commission (Srikrishna 1998).

One of the most extensive and detailed analysis of the riots is available in the form of the Justice Srikrishna Committee Report. The report identifies the deliberate attempts at religious polarisation by the Bharatiya Janata Party and its affiliated right wing organisation called the Sangh Parivar, through a national mobilisation around the contested Ram Janmabhoomi—"the organisation of events like Ram Paduka processions (religious processions) and chowk sabhas (local assemblies) and the reports of violent clashes along the route of the Karseva yatra[9] as the 'the distant thunderclaps portending the storm to come" (Hansen, 1999). The report also differentiates between the first

[9] A public procession by political volunteers mobilized by Hindu Right wing parties

phase of rioting in the city immediately following the demolition of the Babri Masjid which was sporadic, and the riots in the second phase that saw more planned bloodshed encouraged by the Shiv Sena. More academic analyses of the riots trace the riots to the decline of secular working class politics and the cumulative build-up of identity politics in the region (Hansen, 2009).

Figure11: **1993 Bombay Blasts**

The biggest gains accrued to the Shiv Sena in the wake of the riots linked to its emergence as a strong voice for the Hindu Marathi Manoos[10]; one which was perceived to have been subdued for a long period and had not received enough attention. The Shiv Sena came to power at the state level immediately after the riots, and has continued to be an important political player ever since. The riots also facilitated a new spatial geography in the city. Expectedly, there was considerable outmigration by Muslims (Dalvi, 2013), with more than two lakh people fleeing the city, according to police accounts. Economic necessity caused a large section of this population to return within the following year. While some people went back to their old occupations, others switched jobs and started working in places where they felt safer. Many of the Muslim families that fled Central Bombay were migrant workers from Uttar Pradesh. After their initial fears subsided, male members of these families returned to Bombay, but did not think it safe to bring their entire families with them.

The migration of Hindus from Muslim-dominated areas did take place, but this was on a relatively smaller scale in comparison with the large number of Muslims who moved out of localities where they constituted a minority. The riots did not merely create physical boundaries, but also resulted in a conceptualisation of the 'other', which in this case were the Muslims. The consolidation of communities and the number of migrants have not been recorded by any government department. Such an exercise is rendered difficult by the fact that the migration from Muslim minority areas was not a mass movement of people from one locality to another. It occurred over a period of time, and is discernible only through a close examination of the city's population distribution.

The impact of these processes is visible, in particular, in pockets of the city like Central Bombay and Dharavi, which have long formed the empirical basis of popular speculation about the riots. After the riots, many Muslims, who lived in certain pockets in Hindu dominated areas, moved to locales such as Nagpada, Mohammed Ali Road, Bhendi Bazar, and Millat Nagar in Central Bombay, and began staying there (Chatterjee, 2005). Over the years, Central Bombay has become a Muslim-dominated area. The insecurity and fear among Muslim residents led them to add extra floors to

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[10]   Manoos in Marathi refers to people

their houses, and build workshops on rooftops and in multi-storey buildings. Dharavi, which houses approximately a million people, has seen a similar development though it is a slum area. Although Muslims constitute 40 per cent of the population in Dharavi, its economic structure involves close relationships between Hindus and Muslims, particularly in garment manufacturing, leather processing, waste disposal, pottery, and suitcase manufacturing. But in spite of close economic relationships in the 1993 riots, Tamils, Dalits, and members of the Shiv Sena fought against Muslims in Dharavi (Chatterjee, 2005). Another area that has seen its population distribution change is Mumbra in the industrial township of Thane. After the riots, a large number of people from the suburban neighbourhoods of Jogeshwari, Govandi, and Borivali migrated to Mumbra(Dalvi, 2013). Now Muslims account for 80 per cent of Mumbra's population. Mumbra is home to an insecure Muslim population of which middleclass Muslims, who are employed as petty workers, advocates, and teachers, form a sizable proportion.

Figure12: **Images of the riot**

Source: Sudharak Olwe

Such socio spatial transformations have several implications. First, they have changed the mixed, secular character of the city, and paved the way for communal and occupational divisions. Even before the riots, there were Muslim-dominated and Hindu-dominated pockets in Bombay. However, these were seen as matters of cohabitation and personal lifestyle choices. After the riots, the pervasive feeling among Muslims was that they were not safe anywhere in Mumbai. A decade later, towns such as Mumbra showed that Muslims have increasingly come to believe that it is better to live together. Another impact of the riots has been on population distribution in slums. Prior to the riots, in large slums, people identified themselves as part of smaller enclaves, each with distinct identities based on ethnic homogeneity. As a detailed study of slums in Jogeshwari shows, the most significant impact of the riots was the eviction of families and the spatial segregation of particular religious communities into distinct political constituencies (Youth for Unity and Voluntary Action, 1996). Resident associations and Community Based Organisations (CBOs) in slums that were initially formed to fight demolitions became fragmented as an impact of the riots and the organisations' dependence on political association grew. The 1992-1993 riots have thus had both short-term and long-term implications, and have produced deep cleavages in the social fabric of the city.

Epiphany of transition

The 1980s can be seen as the cusp of a major transformation of colonial Bombay. Its position as a premier commercial city where economy was prime with strong local governance institutions—a character of collaborative

governance where elites and the State undertook projects of significance—and where the presence of the labouring poor was tolerated within limits had changed. It gave way to a city whose extensive industrial economy was in a state of decline, whose space economy operated and flourished through a nexus of politics, informality, and crime, and whose local government institutions were highly politicised and began to compromise regional and national entities., It transformed to a city whose infrastructure was highly strained—wherein the slum and the locality became new objects of mobilisation—and whose famed Mumbai spirit was fragmented through communalisation and   the experience of violent riots. The experience of living in the city was beginning to show signs of strain. In the words of Appadurai (2000) "a malignant city began to emerge from beneath the cosmopolitan ethos of the earlier period" (p. 629). Simultaneously, its elites and middle classes began to 're-envision Mumbai as a global city' that competed with other world class cities.

The Making of a Metropolis

4. The Making of a Metropolis

The contemporary city region of Mumbai

The contemporary period for the purpose of this city profile starts from the beginning of the new millennium—a period when the economic reforms unleashed in the previous decade actually began showing an impact. This was also a period when Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) was introduced into the real estate sector, thereby lending strength to one of the largest drivers of contemporary city dynamics. Economically, this is a period when the Indian economy went through ups and downs, and started to feel the first pinches of global integration. Indian capital has made strong forays elsewhere in the world—the country is home to some of the richest people[11] in the world. This period is also marked by an increased concentration of wealth, as well as increased corruption which has reached unprecedented levels following neo-liberalism, with the term 'crony capitalism' being frequently quoted. The structural shift from a predominantly agricultural to a predominantly non-agricultural economy has been painful, because agriculture in several pockets has shown symptoms of distress like farmer suicides. Moreover, industrial growth has stagnated, leading to jobless growth for more than a decade. A simultaneous opening of the economy has meant that land, particularly urban land, has become one of the most prized investments.

Politically, this has been an era of coalition politics and assertion of regions. Concomitant to the shifts in economy, the nature and texture of Indian governance has also transformed. Politics has become a mode of accumulation. Simultaneously, there has been a trend towards NGO-isation of the varied protest movements and social struggles. Shah (2012) observes that there has been a breakdown of the pact between the elites and the political class, which had been built at the time of independence. This has generated turbulence that has permeated varied organs of governance. There has been a politicisation of the bureaucracy along with a trend in governance to bypass democratic processes, and operate through fragmented, ad hoc instruments. At an operational level, the historical legacy of several institutions seems to be under threat. Thus, while this seems to be an era where manifold entitlements (for example, right to education, right to food, and guaranteesfor employment) have been given to the toiling classes, there are signs of non-delivery of services all around.

This is also a juncture where the reform agenda that was launched a decade earlier has acquired an urban edge. At the national level, one of the country's most ambitious programmes for urban development,that is, the JNNURM was launched in 2007. It also resonated with other policy developments that reinforced the urban. The famous slogan 'India lives in its villages' was replaced by 'Cities are the growth engine for the country'. Infrastructure is being seen as a route to making cities competitive in the emergent global environment. Reforms in local governance are a simultaneous initiative, albeit contested and resisted (Bhide, 2009). Slums and the informal sector, earlier seen to be limited to large cities, are now recognized as integral to urbanisation. The country undertook its first slum census in 2001 in cities and towns with a population of 50,000 or moreaccording to the 1991 Census, and increased its scope in 2011 to all statutory towns irrespective of their population size based on the same definition as in the 2001 (Census, 2011). The central government has taken a lead role in instituting 'inclusive governance' at the local level—signalling a key shift in the contours of local governance, which till now had been dominated by the state governments.

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[11] According to the UBS Billionaire Census, 2014, India has 103 billionaires, and is ranked sixth in the world in terms of number of billionaires.

These varied developments have impacted the urbanscape of Mumbai,which now contends with these shifting scales and contours of governance. The clamour for a world class city from policy makers, citizen groups, and corporates alike is one of the defining features of the post-millennium period. The last 10 years have also been characterised by a tremendous investment in the city's transport infrastructure, especially in roads, the metro, and the monorail. These developments, along with redevelopment, have tremendously altered the built environment and the spatial geography of the city. The city region, which was hitherto restricted to a commuting relationship or existed as a notion, is rapidly becoming a lived reality. The economic shift from manufacturing to services is now complete, with several previously manufacturing spaces opening up for real estate development. Identity struggles dominate the political landscape with multiple contours—Hindu-Muslim and Marathi-North Indian being the more dominant ones. The other defining feature of the past decade is several incidents of terror, and rise in violent crimes against women. Cumulatively, Mumbai is increasingly being seen as 'a city at risk'.

The sections below trace the multiple dimensions and emergent transformations of the city at the current moment—both empirically and theoretically. We also link these transformations to the contestations thereof.

Transforming the economy

Mumbai is India's financial capital city, with 23 of India's billionaires living in the city—more than twice as many as Delhi. Mumbai houses the National & Bombay Stock Exchanges, the third and fifth largest exchanges in the world in terms of the number of transactions. Almost all major banks have their headquarters in the city. Mumbai serves as an important economic hub of the country, contributing 10per cent of all factory employment, 40per cent of all income tax collections, 60per cent of all customs duty collections, 20per cent of all central excise tax collections, 40per cent of India's foreign trade, and Rs.40 billion (US$ 810 million) in corporate taxes (Birkinshaw and Harris, 2005-2009). Four of the Fortune Global 500 companies are based in Mumbai. Many foreign banks and financial institutions have either their headquarters or their branches in the city.

Mumbai, however, continues to be a city of national importance rather than one of international or global linkages. In one recent comprehensive study, Mumbai was categorized in the third tier of the world city system along with cities such as Madrid, Seoul and, Kuala Lumpur (Derudder and Taylor, 2005). This is in spite of the fact that the last 15 years or so have witnessed accelerating foreign investment in Mumbai, and a rapid increase in the presence of transnational corporations, especially in the sphere of finance and producer services (Nijman, 2000). Mumbai's greater visibility can be seen as an integral part of the rise of some emerging markets, and the ascent of China and India. On the other hand, there is greater domestic competition to the city from Delhi, which has improved its infrastructure substantially and shown a capacity for responding to needs of capital; Bangalore, which has been able to attract a more educated migrant profile suited to high tech industries; and Gujarat, which has gone out of the way to facilitate investment in industry.

The structural shifts in the city economy that began in the 1980s are now almost complete. There is hardly any large manufacturing industry in the city. Mid-size industries have shifted to the metropolitan region. Slums have become the new site of production through thousands of micro-size, unauthorized factories operating in small rooms of settlements on a twenty-four hour basis. The service sector has expanded massively on both ends of the economy. Nijman (2002) reports that financial and management consulting sectors have been strengthened in the past decade.

Entertainment and hospitality have also registered high growth. On the other end of the economy, street vending, security services, and driving private vehicles have emerged as the highest employment-generating occupations. This is in line with the drawing up of a new business plan for the city.[12] The business plan identifies the following long term vision for MMR, "to transform MMR into a world class metropolis with a vibrant economy and globally comparable quality of life for all its citizens" (LEA Associates, 2006). It identifies new drivers of growth to enable Mumbai to retain its position as India's premier metropolis. These growth drivers are financial services, IT and ITES, media and entertainment, biotech, hospitality and tourism, retail trade, and construction. It is to be noted that the textile and the engineering sectors, which had been the backbone of Mumbai's economy for over a century, are no longer in the picture.

Figure 13: **Maps showing location of CBDs vis-a-vis proposed growth nodes**

Source: (left) Nodes for polycentric development (right) Development plan for greater Mumbai, Preparatory studies document (2014-2034) p. 237

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[12] Drawing up a business plan for the city in itself may be considered a new dimension of planning, which has been focused around land use planning so far. The concept of such a plan and its commissioning are all part of the emergent culture of governance, which emphasizes development authorities and outsourcing.

The decline in the city's economy towards the turn of the century has now been reversed with the city registering an annual GDP growth of 12per cent over the last few years. This has resulted in further increases in the per capita incomes in the city, as shown in the following graph.

Figure 14: **Per capita income at current prices**

Source: Mumbai Human Development Report, 2009, p. 39

Figure 15: **Population, Net District Domestic Product and Per Capita Income of Mumbai: 1991-2001**

Year	Population*	Total NDDP** Mumbai (Rs. in Lakhs)	Per Capita Income (Rs. in Lakhs)
1991	9925891	2516237	0.253502
1992	10111505	2834059	0.280281
1993	10300590	3460671	0.335968
1994	10493211	3803220	0.362446
1995	10689434	4377596	0.409526
1996	10889327	4780675	0.439024
1997	11092957	4827597	0.435195
1998	11300396	4750427	0.420377
1999	11511713	5279394	0.458611
2000	11726982	5927865	0.505489
2001	11978450	6891971	0.575364

Source: Mumbai Human Development Report, 2009

The graph shows that the city's per capita incomes have doubled in the decade of 1991-2001. The annual net income of Rs. 65,361 in Mumbai is 1.5 times that of the state average of Rs. 41,331 and twice the national average of Rs. 29,382(Mumbai Human Development Report, 2009). The city's per capita incomes have increased by 191 per cent between 2000-2001 and 2008-2009, which is three times the increase in the national average (Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai, 2014).

The changing structure of the economy has also changed the class structure in the city. A new upper middle class has emerged in the private sector, mainly in finance, producer services, and ICT. This new middle class is relatively small, and their incomes are considerably higher than that of the old middle class that mainly worked in the government sector. This is why this new segment is better viewed as *upper* middle class. The income differences as compared with Mumbai's toiling masses are enormous, and so are the consumption patterns (Nijman, 2006). The extent of poverty in the city is substantial, even by the low standards of poverty definitions utilised in the country. Even by official estimates (which tend to underestimate), at least 10per cent of the city's population is poor on parameters that include socio-economic criteria along with incomes (Mumbai Human Development Report, 2009).

Employment is an important indicator of economic growth. As mentioned earlier, the bulk of current employment is in the informal sector. Since, 1961, the total work participation rate has been consistent in the range of 35-40 per cent. The female worker participation rate has been rising from 8.81 per cent in 1961 to 16.38 per cent in 2011, and the male participation rate has been steady in the range of 55-58 per cent(Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai, 2014). Further, there has been a feminisation of the informal work force. Shah and Gandhi (1992) demonstrate the extensive spread of women workers in the shadows of several globally linked economic sectors in Mumbai. Women in Mumbai are generally employed in an unregulated, erratic, and insecure labour market (Dewan, 2004), which is generally subcontracted work, home-based production, or family labour system, and the payment is done on a daily basis (Nair, 2007).

The key implication of the current economic situation is the widening gap between incomes and the nature of consumption and lifestyle spurred by the same. While, the high incomes at relatively younger ages of the new middle class has initiated a new culture of consumption(Phadke, 2011), those who work at the other end of the economy are witness to this spectacle of consumption., while being compelled to live and work in conditions of increasing insecurity and uncertainty. The resultant inequities experienced by the urban poor and marginalised has increased and been exacerbated in this period.

Transforming the state-market axis

The developments in the socio-economic sphere have shaped the nature of governance and its priorities in substantive ways. There are several indications of change in the tilt of the state- market axis, as seen in changed priorities of governance, the institutional landscape, and various instruments utilised to initiate change. A report titled 'Mumbai Vision 2020' was launched at the onset of the millennium. It was prepared by Bombay First—a group of corporates who had formed an association along the lines of 'Advantage London', in order to promote Mumbai as a globally competitive city. The report utilises global benchmarks to assess the state of Mumbai's infrastructure. This discussion of Mumbai as a world class city has dominated the city discourse for the last decade and half. The state government formed a Special task Force for Mumbai with representation from several members of Bombay First. In

2005, the Mumbai Vision report was adopted as the City Vision Plan for the purpose of the JNNURM. In 2007, a high powered expert committee formed under the ministry of finance came out with a report on transforming Mumbai into an International Financial Centre. All these developments are illustrative of a growing overlap between business agendas and governance agendas. The resultant implication is the following, in the words of Nijman (2008)

> "The obsession of city and state government and the 'establishment' with growth and with the new growth sectors, along with a more general neoliberal shift, tends to distract from the needs of Mumbai's impoverished urban masses, the great majority of Mumbaikars who have little or no connection to the new middle class". (p 762)

The tilt towards business has resulted in a shift in the modes of governmentality. In the 1970s and after, law was the preferred mode of intervention in the city. Increasingly, the shift is towards the circumvention of the legal process and a resort to projects. Projects in the context of India are a way of bracketing or ring-fencing the nature of intervention and creating special protocols (Bhide, 2012). Evidently, these are preferred instruments to bypass the rigid, uncertain, and delayed outcomes of the legal process, as well as to introduce dynamism and flexibility in state initiatives. Most new infrastructure in the city is being generated via projects. Such projects that utilised 'Public Private Partnership' as a route for mobilisation of funds, were first instituted via the World Bank, and have then shifted to private capital. The institutional landscape has changed, bringing more focus on institutions that are aligned to the new mode of functioning. There are now several institutions that bypass the usual procedural routine. These include the Mumbai Transformation Support Unit (MTSU), the Slum Rehabilitation Authority (SRA), the Mumbai Rail Vikas Corporation (MRVC), and so on.[13] Several of these institutions do not report directly to the legislature, are highly dominated by bureaucrats and technical experts, maintain lean staffing structure, and function through liaisons with the private sector and consultants.

Law as the conventional, primary mode of intervention in domains such as planning had gradually resulted in restricting the scope of state action. Thus, statutes like Urban Land Ceiling Act and city plans that had the force of law were increasingly characterised by non-implementation, as plans were being opposed by landed interests. The new reforms attempted to change these legal provisions. The Urban Land Ceiling Act was repealed in 2008, and the rent control act was revised. There were major modifications in the slum law (Bhide, 2002) that criminalised encroachment. Similarly, new laws, such as the 'Slum Dada' act, that were modelled along lines of anti-terrorism laws were introduced. The direction of these shifts is broadly supportive of the propertied class and anti-poor. However, it was not just law which changed; the nature of jurisprudence changed too. In the case of Mumbai, landmark judgements that upheld housing as linked to dignity and right to life, reiterated the right of the poor to housing and livelihood, and directed the state to undertake steps towards the same were overturned in subsequent cases.[14] The shift in the direction of jurisprudence is classically illustrated by the Sanjay Gandhi National Park (SGNP) case filed by environmental groups in the city to 'free' the park of 'encroachments'. In a series of judgements in which the judges ordered the demolition of over 80,000 slums, the erection of boundary walls and electric fences, and the demolition of all basic amenities such as water taps, toilets, nursery schools, and ration shops in the areas to prevent new

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[13] One of the biggest institutional beneficiaries has been the MMRDA. In the late 1990s it emerged as an institution that could implement projects in line with requirements of international agencies. Today, the MMRDA is involved in the implementation of projects that span a wide scale and a large range of issues that confront the region, while its planning role continues to be undermined.

[14] Olga Tellis case, 1985

encroachment. Justice Krishna Iyer commented upon this judgement and its travesty of justice and called it 'courtastrophe'. The change in law and jurisprudence has impacted another popular avenue of protest and contestation, that is, the Public Interest Litigation or PIL. The PIL had emerged in India as an instrument of justice for the underprivileged sections in an atmosphere where law was the primary instrument of state intervention in several domains. In the changed context, PILs have become an instrument to be applied by the new middle class in order to advance its sensibilities towards environment-planning and rights that were being infringed by encroachments, slums, and vendors (Marie Helene, 2007). Courts in India, including the Mumbai High Court, have passed strictures on what is considered to be 'frivolous PILs' and linked them to monetary penalties. Several activists thus claim that this has contributed to the 'constriction' of space for struggle in the city (Das, 1995).

On the other hand, reforms that have been anticipated by international capital have also been slow, or have not been implemented at all. The following table is illustrative of the range of actions taken in pursuit of the same in the last two decades.

Figure 16: **Mumbai transformation process**

Mumbai Transformation Process			
Objective	Benchmark	Project/s other changes initiated	Comments
Boost economic growth by focusing on high and low end services, hinterland manufacturing	• 8%-10% growth p.a.	• Business plan being prepared • Conversion of Bandra Kurla Complex (BKC) into international finance hub • 12 SEZs approved between Mumbai and Pune. Of these two are in the city.	• In the last three years growth has already reached a rate of 12% p.a. • SEZs in the vicinity of the city are ITES • Manufacturing not picking up, rather closure of major industries in the MMR region too
Improve and expand mass and private transport infrastructure	• Travelling Population per rail car to be Less than 220 People • 1 bus for every Thousand People • Increasing the speed of travel to 40 kmph • Tripling freeways / expressways to 6-8 • Increasing the number of public parking spaces – 40 – 50 slots per 1000 vehicles	• MUTP • Bandra-Worli Link • MUIP • Eastern Freeway • Metro Rail • Coastal Road • Elevated rail corridor from Churchgate to Virar • MTHL • Mono Rail	• Transport is being developed as one of the mo st key infrastructure arenas with maximum investment. • Emphasis on private transport in a context where parking is becoming a menace
Dramatically increase low income housing availability	1.1 million houses	• Around 55,000 houses created for R & R – MUTP, MUIP and Mithi River Phase 1. • Scale of SRA projects enhanced • Cluster redevelopment and affordable housing policy adopted • Application of redevelopment to MMR	• Ambitious projects such as Dharavi Redevelopment have not seen the light of the day • Around 100000 te nements created under SRA

Mumbai Transformation Process			
Objective	Benchmark	Project/s other changes initiated	Comments
Create dedicated 'Mumbai Infrastructure Fund'	• Annual funding of Rs. 1500 crore • 10% of per capita income as per capita revenue to local government	• Funding from JNNURM – 1,50,000 crore to MCGM • MMRDA emerged as a largest investor in infrastructure in Mumbai and the region	• No consolidated fund dedicated to infrastructure development and maintenance created so far. • Revenue transfers to local government highly mediated by state government • Entry of private funds restricted to few sectors and with significant public viability funding
Upgrade water, sanitation, education, health care	• Water – 250-300 lpcd through piped water • Sanitation – 100 toilets per million people • Education – A dropout rate reduced to 3% - 5 % of enrolment • Health – 4-5 public and private beds per 1000 people	• World Bank also supported JNNURM for water and sanitation. Education and health care being privatized. • Middle Vaitarna Project • Gargai and Pinjal • Comprehensive water supply and distribution programme	• A dual structure of services being created one market supported high end services for the elite and the other end being poorly administered public services.
Make governance more responsive and efficient	• Key process of building approvals to be reduced from 90 -180 days to less than 45 days. • Less than 500 complaints per annum per million people with 95 -99% complaints redressed.	• Suvidha (convenience) outlets in corporation for electronic registration and licensing. • Computerized complaint system • Citizen Facilitation Centers are being introduced	• Decentralization to the ward and sub- ward level almost absent.

Source: Adaptation from Staking a claim, 2010

Dimensions of Mumbai—Transformation process

It is evident that a lot of changes in Mumbai have been initiated and legitimated by the 'world class city' programme; however the implementation of these changes remains highly contested. Also, there is a simultaneous pursuit of policies that may be against the grain of a straightforward tilt to business. In Chattaraj's (2012) assessment, the state-market axis in the case of Mumbai has not evolved into a 'growth machine' capable of catalyzing large scale urban projects. It continues to be a 'jugaad'[15] state that attempts to balance competing interests and give in to contrary directions.

The two major instruments that have affected large scale change in the city are infrastructure (especially transport infrastructure), and redevelopment. These embody the complexities of the changing state-market axis. We examine these in detail.

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[15] Refers to being resourceful and innovative with limited resources

Infrastructure

In the logic of the world class city, infrastructure is seen to be a driver of economic growth. The Munbai Vision document, models itself after the experience of Shanghai, which transformed from an unpainted wreck to a world class city. The document describes the transition of Shanghai in the following words:

> **"**In 1987 Shanghai was a dimly lit, unpainted financial wreck. With Zhu Rongji's term as mayor from 1987 to 1991, the city witnessed vast renaissance like improvements. He led the development and opening up of Pudong. Infrastructure goes first was the strategy followed by Pudong since it began its development. It undertook ten major infrastructural projects as a result of which Shanghai grew at 8-10 per cent, per annum in the nineties and Pudong at between 16-18 per cent, per year. Moreover, the $40 billion investment in infrastructure changed the face of Shanghai... and its roads, buildings, transport and telecom emerged as the best in the world**".** (Bombay First, 2000)

Bombay First advocated a similar strategy for Mumbai. In 2003, the Mumbai Vision Plan identified Rs.200,000crores as a cap for infrastructure development. The City Development Plan (CDP) identified investment needs of Rs.57,000 crores, and the MMR business plan identified Rs.1,73,000crores as funds for infrastructure development. It is to be noted in this context that living conditions in the city have been deteriorating, especially after the 1960s, and that the need for investment in municipal infrastructure is very real. Some of the indicators of the crumbling infrastructure are overcrowded trains and buses, and congested roads. The public transportation system is reeling under pressure with rail coaches carrying an excess of 4,000 passengers per train, where design capacity is 1,800. Crucial basic services like water supply, sanitation, drainage, education facilities, and open spaces are at crisis points. Flooding and the ensuing crisis on 26 July 2005 illustrates that the city's services and planning systems are rapidly reaching the threshold of breakdown. Since the 1990s, the city has seen a spate of investment in infrastructure through various routes—national urban development programmes such as JNNURM, bilateral funding, soft loans by international lending agencies such as the World Bank, and public private partnerships. The directions of these investments are, however, quite different.

A review of the projects initiated in the last two decades indicates that most of them are linked to transportation, particularly the creation of roads. Beginning with theRs. 4526 crores World Bank support for the Mumbai Urban Transport Project, transport represents more than 50 per cent or over Rs. 94,000 crores, of the total estimates for the Mumbai Business plan. The significance of all these projects is apparent when they are seen together. The scale of their funding (cumulatively Rs.30,000crores) exceeds the State Government budget and budgets for several welfare schemes by several times. Their underlying objects and budgets, therefore, need to be taken seriously (Anand, 2006). The most important objective underlying these transportation projects is 'connectivity'. For healthy and global cities, the free flow of goods and ideas is critical, andhence the importance of efficient traffic dispersal, quick entry and exit, and elimination of bottlenecks.

For every project that has taken off, there is a story of delayed projects or projects that have been put on hold as illustrated by the table in the previous section. Thus, while projects together represent an emphasis on the 'world class city' idea; they do not seem to be conforming to a grand plan with several areas of dissonance. Moreover, every project seems to follow distinctive politico-economic trajectories, where interests at various scales ranging from micro to global intersect, tussle, and negotiate in various ways. In the case of transport projects, decisions such as alignment of

routes, design of routes, mode of financing, institutions through which implementation is undertaken, decisions on and negotiations over resettlement and rehabilitation, and schedule and timing of implementation become a part of these trajectories. In a city consumed over the last two decades by an infrastructure frenzy, constant uncertainty and politics over these decisions is a given.

Figure 17: **MUTP proposals map**

Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/c/c2/Mumbai_suburban_rail_map.png

While the cumulative impact and benefits of these projects are yet to be seen, displacement of several thousand households, which have borne the single-most adverse impact of projects, has been widely experienced. The MUTP and MUIP projects together displaced over 25000 households. The MMRDA in 2006 estimated that just three infrastructure projects, namely,the expansion of ChhatrapatiShivaji International Terminal (CSIT) Airport and strengthening of the major road network and water pipelines would displace 2,00,000 slum households. The expanding scale of displacement reiterates the underlying vulnerability of slums, the fragility of their claims to the city, and the sanctity with which property rights are upheld, and shows how they are hardly ever impacted by these projects and the righteousness with which every infrastructure project is unquestioningly seen as a contributing to the development of the city. The resultant displacement has several dimensions.

Figure 18: Two prominent directions that resettlement has taken; from South to North and West to East

Source: Staking a claim, 2010; Pg: 134

Ostensibly, the programme incorporates rehabilitation. However, studies demonstrate that the number of those rehabilitated is much lesser than those displaced. The other impacts of displacement include the fragmentation of communities and of households, the displacement of livelihoods, the additional burden of cost of schools and health, and heightened costs of maintenance of premises. Moreover, the use of market instruments to generate housing for the project effected, has meant that the city has not only been able to offset the costs of rehabilitation (which in earlier years would have been prohibitive for the state), but has created an excess stock of such housing, removed the major road blocks to infrastructure projects, and piloted a methodology for undertaking such projects(Staking a Claim, 2008).Anand, (2006) further comments—

> "A road that connects Mumbai to modernity must be a road in which there is predictable and continuous movement. Such modern roads do not exist in Mumbai. They have to be made by removing uses of the street considered unacceptable and subsequently, by inscribing these emptied streets with markers of world class." (p. 3424)

Figure 19: **Proposed MMR transportation 2031**

Source: Presentation for consultation workshop to discuss the current status and preparation of the Draft Regional Plan for the Mumbai metropolitan region, MMRDA, 2014

Redevelopment: The instrument of change

In the 1990s, spatial planning instruments such as Accommodation Reservation (AR) and Transfer of Development (TDR) began to be applied as development instruments, through modifications in the development control rules, and to implement the objectives of the development plan. The initial response to these spatial incentives was mixed. However, these instruments were popularised through their application to large geographies like slums, and as transport projects they opened up new spatial development potentials. In the last 20 years of implementation of the development or the land use plan of the city (Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai, 2014),these instruments have transformed the built environment of the city in substantive ways, often in contravention to the plan itself (UDRI, 2014).AR and TDR are property market linked incentives and have currently become the 'instrument of choice' for a loan-burdened state government, which sees the city as a gold mine. Redevelopment has emerged as the key instrument of change in a city where property prices are extremely high, available land area for development is highly restricted due to varied factors, and there are multiple and contesting pressures on space. Redevelopment in Mumbai has emerged as a strategic solution for multiple issues. Its application began with slums, old government housing colonies, and dilapidated housing, but has since extended to arenas such as developing parking places and gardens, generating public rental housing and other public amenities,and tackling the massive problem of unauthorised housing.

Figure 20: **Distribution of three types of TDR generated in Mumbai**

*Source:*Nainan, 2008

There was a spate of slum demolitions towards the beginning of the new millennium when the slogan of converting Mumbai to Shanghai was at its shrillest. In 2001-20002, there were widespread series of demolitions in the SGNP, which destroyed homes of about 80,000 people. In 2003-2004, the city witnessed its largest ever demolitions that destroyed more than 100,000 homes at 44 sites, thus clearing up 300 acres of land. Predictably, these demolitions were followed by a reaction that not only extended to civil society but also to the political realm. Ever since these demolitions, while the discourse on a slum-free city has gained ground in several Indian cities, and has become a key urban policy preoccupation, the instrument for the same has changed. Resettlement and rehabilitation of slums have

emerged as the instruments of choice. When the initial SRD Programme was launched, most developers were not interested in taking these projects up due to the 20per cent profit margin (Mukhija, 2001). With the fall of the Congress government that had initiated this program, the new Slum Rehabilitation Policy (SRS) came into being, which changed the face of the redevelopment story in the city. The outcomes for the slum dwellers have been mixed. A study conducted by Tata Institute of Social Sciences (TISS) in 2003 indicated a whole host of problems that the people rehabilitated in these areas were experiencing. The violence of the resettlement could be witnessed in the way these communities were fractured during the process. Most of the families that had been relocated to the resettlement colonies belonged to the low income groups, and with their livelihoods disappearing, increasingly found it difficult to pay the maintenance charges for the buildings that they lived in. They also lost their networks of social relations. This led to extreme dense built environment, which now resemble vertical slums. When these areas had been initially built, they had very little access to basic services, and still continue to have very low access to services. Located in the peripheries, these resettlement colonies experience restrictions such as inadequate access to transportation, employment, water connections, sewerage, solid waste collection, education and health amenities.

The experimentation with smaller scales of redevelopment, covering single buildings or small areas, over the last two decades has now given way to large scale cluster developments covering more than 4000 square metres. For instance, the Bhendi Bazaar redevelopment scheme involves nine clusters on a total area of 16.5 acres; each of these will have two or three towers. Of the 17 buildings planned, 12 will be reserved for about 20,000 tenants. The project will be completed in phases by 2020, at an estimated cost of Rs 3,000 crores. In an area that is known to have a sizeable Muslim population from different socio-economic backgrounds, a dense network of small workshops and commercial ventures and contains the bulk of old buildings in the city, the implications of such a large scale redevelopment project are multifarious. Similarly, the Dharavi Redevelopment Project envisages the redevelopment of the 525 acres of the erstwhile slum, rehabilitating over 1,00,000 families into tenements of 269 square feet.

*Figure 21:*Bhendi Bazaar redevelopment scenario

Source: http://www.sbut.in/bhendi-bazaar_future.html

These projects involve more sophisticated negotiations with users and their entitlements. Redevelopment has attracted several new players into the real estate business. Currently, almost every large corporate house in Mumbai has a real estate arm; however it also operates through an elaborate network, where joint ventures are created and dismantled, where actors perform specialised roles in persuasion of residents and other users of space, where rights are defined in an uncertain space, and where lobbying is done with both the government andwith regular construction work (Nainan, 2012).

The shifts in the political culture are supportive of these transformations. This period has been characterised by a high degree of intervention by the state government in city planning. However, these interventions themselves see the city as a site of resource generation via the property market; thus, they are facilitative of schemes that employ market linked spatial incentives such as those mentioned above. The conflicts in the ruling party at the municipal level and the state level for the last 15 years have not stood in the way of such schemes and projects which are seen as 'development' that does not require resource investment by the state; in fact, there is competition to introduce more such schemes and projects. Redevelopment has involved keeping a tight state control on developable space and keeping overall development potential low, and then giving much higher development rights for application to particular purposes. Thus, while the overall development potential of Mumbai city region ranges from 0.5 to 1.33 Floor Space Index; the permissible potential in redevelopment areas (dependent on particular purpose) can go up to 4.0 FSI.The developers identify blocks, persuade people for redevelopment, and negotiate deals and execute them. The state's role as a facilitator is to create a framework in which such redevelopment can happen, to allot requisite development rights, and to charge premiums on the same.

Redevelopment has thus converted residents and the State, as well as politicians into entrepreneurs. Redevelopment is thus a key site where contestations, negotiations, and conflicts are being played out (Bhide, 2013). Slums are the primary target of redevelopment, and they also offer maximum returns. Further, since this is a space where rights are uncertain, it has also emerged as a space where claims are settled. Residents aspire for larger free space, local leaders attempt to use their influence to garner more space, politicians are involved in negotiations in particular deals as well as partners in projects, small developers link to larger ones to manipulate size of projects, and officials and bureaucrats seize opportunities to make money. Crime, black money, and corruption are rife in the political economy of redevelopment. Weinstein (2008) observes that this has led to a nexus among crime, politics, and the real estate business.

The spatial impact of redevelopment using AR and TDR has been so significant that it has changed what was envisaged in the Development Plan for whose implementation these instruments were devised. The 1991 Development Plan of Mumbai reduced the FSI of the island city to 1.33 and retained the FSI for most of the suburbs to 1.The actual land use indicates that bulk consumption of FSI in greater Mumbai ranges from 0.93 to 7.35 and above (Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai, 2014) . The table below summaries the consumption of the FSI in Greater Mumbai. Redevelopment thus signifies an abandonment of a grand plan and instead, allows the city to emerge in response to market whims. There is a blurring of boundaries between the various arms of the state and the market.

Figure 22: Summary of FSI consumption pattern in Greater Mumbai

Summary

Island City has a very high consumption of Net Bulk FSI due to concentration of both commercial and office land use. The population density in these Wards is also significantly higher than that in the Western and Eastern Suburbs.

Western Suburbs have lower Net Bulk FSI consumption than the Island City due to predominant residential land use. Population density,also, is lower here than in the Island City.

Eastern Suburbs have a very low and uniform consumption of Net Bulk FSI due to large areas occupied by slums. Although the Net Bulk FSI consumption is low, the population density is high. While most of the Eastern edge of the Eastern Suburbs is occupied by Natural Areas such as mangroves, mudflats, saltpans,and so on, the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) and mangrove forests occupy the Southern edge.

Source: Development plan for greater Mumbai, Preparatory studies document (2014-2034) Pg. 111

People and places: The emergent spatial geography

During the last three decades, population growth in the island city has been found to be negligible, whereas that in the suburbs is increasing at a fairly high rate. In the suburbs it has been observed that the Western regions (wards H, K, P & R) have a higher population than in the Eastern suburbs (wards L, M, N, S& T). There has been a continuous growth of the population of Greater Mumbai in absolute numbers.The annual compound growth rate has drastically reduced from 3.28 per cent during 1971-1981, to 1.84 per cent in 1991-2001, and further to 0.41 per cent in 2001-2011. This, the growth in Mumbai is largely due to natural increase. Yet, in 2001, Greater Mumbai was found to have a gross density of 27,715 persons per square km., making it one of the densest cities in the world.

The Mumbai urban agglomeration today is the largest in the world with its population exceeding 18 million (Bhagat and Jones, 2013). The patterns of population distribution in the metropolitan region indicate that there has been a gradual shift of population towards the surrounding towns of MMR, away from the main city of Greater Mumbai.

Figure 23: MMR Population Density, 1991

Source: "Comprehensive Transport Plan for Bombay Metropolitan, W S Atkin's Study, 1994

The population of MMR increased from 77.92 lakhs in 1971, to 220 lakhs in the year 2011. The share of Greater Mumbai's population in all of MMR, which was 76.63 per cent in the year 1971, reduced to 63.06 per cent in 2001. On the other hand, the Municipal Corporations of Thane, Kalyan-Dombivali, Bhiwandi-Nizampur, Mira-Bhayandar, and Navi Mumbai registered substantial growth in their population, particularly during 1981-2001.

It was further observed that MMR was a highly urbanised area where growth in urban population was around 3 per cent during 1971-2011. There had been an increase in the number of urban centres in the region; from 19 to 38 as recorded by 1981 Census. The total number of villages in the region had reduced from 1039 in 2001 to 964 in 2011. During this period, 22 villages (11 each in the Thane and Raigad districts) had been re-classified as Census Towns based on demographic criteria[16] even when these settlements do not have an Urban Local Body[17]. Additionally, 49 villages were amalgamated with the Vasai-Virar Municipal Corporation and with the Kalyan-Dombivali Municipal Corporation. These trends illustrate the growing trend of metropolitisation of Mumbai.These trends of metropolitisation raise new questions. Is metropolitisation a natural process, an inevitable process, or the imposition of the city on the region? What are the consequences of each of these? What interests do these processes embed within themselves? How does policy arbitrate these decisions? They also raise new questions about the changing geography of the city. The depopulation of the city is being interpreted as a trend in keeping with other metro cities that are experiencing a structural shift in economies (Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai, 2014). It is also being predicted that Mumbai city will continue to register decelerated population growth in years to come. Is this a natural shift experienced by all cities—following some kind of natural laws of city form? Or is this a shift linked to a deliberate move to depopulate the city, especially of its working class?

Spatial segregation in Mumbai has followed the contours of its natural topography, infrastructure development, and geography of work. Given the particular dynamics of Mumbai, it partly reflects the directives of development plans, partly the insurgent developments, and several other parts reflect a combination of multiple forces that refuse to fit into neat analytical categories. Moreover, spatial constraints unique to Mumbai has meant that while different localities developed as linked to particular groups; the 'exclusivity' of these areas was within very small spatial circles.

Riots, redevelopment, and the emerging city region have changed a lot of these spatial patterns. The new geography does not have a complex and layered social segregation, but is segregated on the basis of just a few parameters. There is class-affluence on the West, and poverty in the East. Dalits live in a corridor along the Northeast, and Muslims in a few tight pockets in Central Mumbai and the suburbs.

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[16] Places which satisfy the following demographic criteria: - i) A minimum population of 5000; ii) At least 75per cent of male working population engaged in non-agricultural pursuits; and iii) A density of population of at least 400 persons per square km.

[17] Urban Local Bodies such as a municipality, municipal corporation, cantonment board or notified town area committee and so on are those which are formed under State law.

The diagram above shows the difference in geographies of the city based on residential prices. This diagram clearly outlines the difference in island city wards and the Dalit or slum dominant suburbs. Another axis of spatial geography in Mumbai is the distribution of slums in the city. A characteristic of the city in the 1970s was that slums were part of the city's spatial fabric. Thus, even the most posh neighbourhoods such as Malabar Hill had to overlook slums. The diagram below, reflecting the distirbution of slums in different wards of the city as per the 2001 Census, shows that this situation has started changing with roughly 9 enumeration blocks in the island city being free of slums. Further, more than 20 enumeration blocks have above 60 per cent of the slums. In the 2011 Census, this spatial distribution has changed further.

Figure 25: Percentage of slum population to total population, 2001

GREATER MUMBAI MUNICIPAL CORPORATION
PERCENTAGE OF SLUM POPULATION
TO TOTAL POPULATION 2001
(SECTIONS)

PERCENTAGE OF SLUM POPULATION
- 15.00 AND BELOW
- 15.01 - 30.00
- 30.01 - 45.00
- 45.01 - 60.00
- 60.01 AND ABOVE
- NO SLUM EB
- ROCK
- MUD

Source: 2001 Census Data, Town Maps, Mumbai Municipal Corporation percentage of slum population

Figure 26: **Slum population and non-slum population, 2011**

Source: Development plan for greater Mumbai, Preparatory studies document (2014-2034) Pg. 89

The highly intertwined spatial geography of the city seems to be giving way to a geography which is more segregated. A classic example of the emerging exclusion in terms of spatial justice is the M ward. The M ward is a ward in the Northeast of Mumbai. As a ward on the seaward edge, it is a site for hazardous industries such as petrochemicals, fertilisers, and atomic energy reactors. It also houses a major solid waste dumping site. With large industrial estates and their housing colonies juxtaposed with the slum communities and institutionalised populations that had been relocated to this ward in the 1970s, the M Ward made for a mix of middle class and poor communities living together. According to the 2001 census, nearly 60 per cent of the total population in the ward was seen to be residing in slum settlements. The spate of redevelopment based on real estate market logic has meant that more than 54per cent of the slum TDR is generated in M ward. Further, the ward has become home to more than 50,000 new households that have been resettled as project-affected populations. The preliminary reports of the 2011 Census suggest that 85per cent of the population in M ward stays in slums. On the other hand, it has very poor economic and social infrastructure, emerging as the ward with the lowest Human Development Index in the city (Human Development Report, 2009). M ward thus represents the emergent contours of spatial injustice.

Transforming the social fabric

The social and spatial dynamics in neighbourhoods have substantively changed. From colonial times, the city had fairly segregated social spaces. However, these were also accompanied by aspects of life that were shared. The experience of public transport , the school education system that combined civic entrepreneurialism with state support, the presence of 'maidans' and open spaces in close vicinity of neighbourhoods, and the ability to protest, were critical components of these shared spaces, and were fairly cosmopolitan in nature. The non-investment in critical infrastructure for a prolonged period since the late 1970s, and the extreme strain on space generated by housing shortages have taken a toll on these shared spaces that form the 'material dimensions of city ness' (Rao, 2007). The education system has increasingly been privatised, with the decline of the public educational system, which was never fully in place to begin with. Public amenities that have been developed through the use of market mechanisms such as ADR and TDR (explained in the next section) have also not been able to retain a public character (Navtej, 2012). Cultural space in the city has always been divided along community lines, but in recent years, it has taken the form of congealed identities and politics that at the same time feeds on 'otherisation' and hate-mongering. The divided city has thus turned into a city characterised by deep cleavages between communities.

A key contributory factor is the change in the middle class. The middle class of the post-independence era was largely a government employee class, and had sensibilities that aligned with the working class and toilers. In the period following liberalisation, Fernandes (2004) points out how "middle class consumers have emerged as the cultural symbols of a nation that has opened its borders to consumer goods". She further asserts that the visibility of the middle class sets into motion a 'politics of forgetting' with regard to marginalised social groups. Such forgetting takes material form in the shape of actions and litigations lodged against slum dwellers and hawkers, with whom there is an otherwise active exchange of services. The divide between the rich and the poor thus appears to be attenuated.

Pendse (1995) and Hansen (2009) actually trace the growth of identity politics in a void created by the decline of the manufacturing sector and the reduction of the secular movements of an organized working class. The emergence of identity politics has been accompanied by the insidious emergence of mobocracy—an offshoot of representative politics. This orderly density is fragile. In fact, recently, there have been indications of the emergence of a mobocracy that functions through attacks by perpetrators via offensive Facebook posts, molestations of women in celebrations

around the New Year, and other occasions where crowds are generated. This mobocracy also manifests itself through riotous behaviour post public meetings, violence post arguments,andvandalism of theatres and other artistic displays, that may be found offensive. Some of this may be planned or form a part of political agendas, but many such incidents are linked to a casual show of power in public domains. Some research reports in slum sites suggest that such mobocracy is becoming a part of everyday life, often taking the form of harassment of girls who go to schools or to the community tap to fill water. All these can be seen as symptoms of a city 'at risk' in multiple ways. These, accompanied by the loss of shared spaces and the erosion of public culture, contribute to a city where everyday life has become uncertain and peace is fragile.

The response to such fear has been through the creation of gated communities and corporate parks. Within such newly built compounds there is a prevalence of security guards and the gates are high, and monitored through close circuit cameras. These enclaves are places that try to encapsulate everything that could be seen as a part of the public interactions of society, such as schools, hospitals, and leisure, within the smaller realm of the housing society. On the other hand, the same processes have given rise to rehabilitation and resettlement colonies. These areas in the city are the newly forming ghettos or vertical slums, devoid of the most basic services, and even the most basic notions of safety and security. People from all over the city have been resettled to these colonies, and have been dumped there without any consideration to earlier spatial organisations. The privatisation of space, and diminishing community spaces in the city, has raised the levels of insecurity to a great extent. Incidents of terror and reported crime have produced fear, and in a self-providing society, have given rise to the 'privatisation' of security and surveillance. Several neighbourhoods, schools, and even streets have now been installed with 'close circuit televisions'. Investment in security arrangements and screening of prospective employees and tenants has intensified, when previously it had beennegligible. The emphasis on security is further encouraged by practices of policing. It is ironic that the job of a security guard engages one of the largest employment numbers in the city.In such a fragmented society, particular groups stand out as being particularly victimised. These are women and Muslims.

Gender is a key axis of fragmentation in the city. On one hand, the city provides immense opportunities to women to capacitate themselves, and to express and contribute. On the other hand, most gender parameters recount a story of discrimination. Caste, class, and religion also act as markers of attenuated gendered disadvantage. The consistent fall in sex ratios in the city are partly explained by male in migration to the city, but also indicate a grave male-bias that is attenuated by 'urban' factors. Though education enrolment ratios are uniform across both the sexes, they rise unfavourably as education levels rise (Human Development Report, 2009). Femalework participation rates continue to be at 16per cent.Large proportions of women work in worse conditions at lesser pays, and bear double and sometimes triple burdens of household work, earning work, and community management. The breakdown of community and family support systems and the lack of adequate social infrastructure, disadvantages women in myriad ways. Furthermore, in recent years there has been a trend towards increased crimes against women in public spaces. At the same time, there has been a rise in forms of assertion,which can be seen as deeply problematic. These include the organisation of women to 'safeguard traditional values and institutions', the use of women as fronts to intimidate opposition in street struggles as well as in corporations and the legislature, and violence perpetrated by women against women.

The trend of ethnic 'cleansing' (Appadurai, 2000) or spatial purification (Masselos, Kapoor, Fernandes&Chaudhuri, 2009) that was set in motion with the riots of 1992-1993 has taken much more heinous forms in the recent past. The exclusion of Muslims takes multiple forms ranging from exclusion from jobs (Mhaskar, 2013), deprivation of basic amenities (Contractor, 2012), spatial ghettoisation (Khan, 2007), and even more importantly,demonisation(Jha and Shahjahan, 2010). Further, the city seems to find new targets for ethnic violence. Migrants, especially those from

North India, have emerged as the new targets formobilising masses against, with new political and social equations emerging in the form of alliances between the Republican Party(representing Dalits) and the Shiv Sena (Hindu Maharashtrian). In the context of a nation where a strong overlap between communal and developmental agendas is being observed, local politics in Mumbai seems to be revolving around constant uncertainty, fear, and the consequent mobilisation of people on the basis of religious, caste and regional identities.

Transforming Trajectories of Violence in the City

5. Transforming Trajectories of Violence in the City

Violence as an instrument: Protest in contemporary Mumbai

Violence is an instrument that has been actively used in the city, both at an individual as well as at the group level by marginalized sections in the city, to direct attention to their grievances and to expand their repertoire of resources. Since the late colonial period, the city has gained the reputation of a city of protest. Till the early 1980s, these protests and mobilisations were strongly influenced by the Left or its variants, took the shape of large public gatherings such as 'morchas',[18] 'bandhs',[19] and 'dharnas'[20] on the streets or public spaces, and were often secular in character(Heuze, 2011;Gandhy and Kumar, 1988). In a review of protests in the city from 1988 to 2008, Heuze (2011) points out to the following trends-

i)   The workers' struggles have been declining. This is linked to structural changes in the economy in its transition from formal to informal, and the evolution of the new economic policy and labour laws that discourage protest. This was aggravated by the conservative politics ushered in by the association of trade unions with the Shiv Sena and criminal elements, that sought to dissipate concerted movements by workers. The media, which bought into the goal of a consumption-led world class city, neglected workers and their protests. However, some groups of workers, such as certain sections of municipal workers and public sector bank employees, managed to gain some attention for their demands through these tactics of public demonstrations. In recent times, new categories of the 'self-employed' such as hawkers and taxi and rickshaw workers have started to mobilize their demands through public protests. This is a new development, and these unions have emerged as strong associations in voicing their collective demands to the city, as well as in negotiating for everyday demands such as licences and increased fares.

ii)   Housing is a central issue in the city, and continues to evoke protests at smaller scales. Perhaps one of the more successful illustrations of the housing struggle is that of the mill workers, who were able to assert their demands to public housing after a decade of struggle. There continues to be numerous small-scale mobilisations over displacements, resettlements, and evictions under the SRA. Ironically, several Non-Government Organizations, which spearheaded such mobilisations in the 1980s, have now become active agents in the implementation of slum redevelopment schemes. Organizations such as GharBachaoGharBanao Andolan have stepped in to mobilise groups and communities, but the nature of this mobilization remains highly localised. The space of mobilisation for housing rights has been effectively infiltrated by the alliance between the state and the market, making it difficult to sustain the struggle.

iii)   Middle class residents and certain elements of the bourgeoisie have increasingly gained traction in the city in the last 20 years, protesting against a variety of perceived lack of governance, law and order, and civic issues. These groups have raised their voices against encroachment by slums and hawkers, demanding that such 'unplanned' and 'irregular' developments be demolished. Lacking in numbers, such groups have actively invoked the media, the bureaucracy, and the courts in order to gain attention.

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[18] Public procirssions

[19] The shut-down of utilities such as transport, shops and general street life

[20] Strikes or sit-in demonstrations

iv)   Symbolic protests and identity struggles are on the rise in the city. The specific poles of these mobilisations are along ethnic and religious dimensions, such as those by the OBC-Marathas, the Dalits, and the Sunni Muslims. While it can be argued that the class dimension (the popular element in these struggles which emerged in the 1980s) is receding and giving way to more symbolic or cultural elements, these new forms of identity-based mobilisations can also be seen as ways to cope and acquire more traction in a city in which several affluent communities such as the Parsis, the Jains, and the Bohris have already organised, and have immense access to resources and services in the city

Despite these newly emerging alliances and mobilisations by different groups trying to press their demands and rights to the city, the spaces for protest, demonstration, and gatherings, have significantly diminished over the years. Das (1995) points out to the ways in which the spaces for protest have become regularised and controlled by confining them to the Azad Maidan, or restricting movement within and beyond the Maidan, and by the overall reduction in public spaces for public meetings. The city still sees a significant number of protests (more than 300 per year, as per police data) through the year, but the experience of large scale events that brought the city to a standstill is a thing of the past.

Violence as an outcome

Not all crime involves the use of physical violence;for example, economic crime, theft, and cheating. Similarly, not all violent acts are considered to be crimes; for instance, marital rape and unreported incidents of everyday violence that occur within the private and public realms. Social structures, and the labelling of particular acts as crime and specific groups or their activities as criminal, is evidently shot through with power. Violence and crime, therefore, are different conceptual categories with the latter being legally recognised by the State which allocates penalties.

The change in the governance system from colonial to national did not change the basic architecture of law and legal institutions in India. Thus, understandings of crime show significant continuity. Legal reforms have introduced some tension over what constitutes as illegal, and there exists considerable contradictions within different acts, thus muddying definitions, and perhaps eliciting selective responses and interpretations. For instance, the Beggary Act of Mumbai 1959, criminalises begging as a profession. It empowers the police to detain any person who is begging or is about to be begging. Other changes have been in the area of anti-terror laws. A body of law has been created to deal with the terrorism and organised crime. The Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act, 1999, (MCOCA) which was implemented to fight terrorism in Maharashtra and specially in Mumbai, does not stipulate prosecution of police officers found guilty of its misuse and a person is presumed guilty unless he is able to prove his innocence. Against this backdrop, the analysis of incidence of crime in the city is instructive.

Mumbai continues to be characterised by relatively low levels of crime in relation to other megacities of the world, although there has been an increase in the levels of crime in last few years, and the city has fairly high levels of crime in relation to other cities in India. In 2012, Mumbai recorded 30,508 cognizable crimes,that is, about 6.4 per cent of the total number of urban crimes in the country, second only to Delhi, which contributed to 10.1 per centof total crimes in cities. The level of crime in Mumbai is comparable to that of Bengaluru, but is much higher than Ahmedabad(4.5 per cent), Chennai(3.4per cent), and Kolkata (5.4 per cent),according to National Crimes Record Bureau data in 2012.In comparison to cities in the global south, the homicide rate in Mumbai that stands at 1.3 per 100,000

population is one of the lowest in the world, especially in comparison to Sao Paolo (20.8 in 2004, reduced to 10.8 in 2009) and Cape Town (77 in 2001, reduced to 59.9 in 2007), according to United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC 2009). The UNODC report points out that megacities are at definite risk in terms of violent crimes, but also emphasises that there seem to be other, more enduring national and regional characteristics, that create a propensity towards higher degrees of violence.

DeveshKapur (2012) argues on the basis of recorded data on violence across categories such as communal riots, homicides, political violence, and domestic violence, that India as a country has become less violent in last decade. The rate of homicides that had peaked to 45 per million in 1991-1992 from 25 per million in the 1960s, has now dropped to 28 per million in 2009. Deaths due to riots also peaked in 1981 to 157 per million, and have dropped to 54 per million in 2009. There has also been a significant drop in deaths from violence in the private realm, such as dowry deaths, as well in the public realm, such as deaths during political violence and insurgencies. The following figure shows the incidence of crime in the city from 2008 to 2012.

*Figure 2*7: **Occurrence of crime in Mumbai city**

Specific Crime	2008-09	2009-10	% Increase 2008-09 to 2009-10	2010-11	% Increase 2009-10 to 2010-11	2011-12	% Increase 2010-11 to 2011-12	2012-13	% Increase 2011-12 to 2012-13
Murder	197	219	11%	213	-3%	199	-7%	202	2%
Rape	186	158	-15%	165	4%	187	13%	294	57%
Molestation	413	384	-7%	483	26%	554	15%	793	43%
Riot	258	333	29%	334	0%	329	-1%	360	9%
House Breaking (Day/Night)	2541	2788	10%	3035	9%	2565	-15%	2578	1%
Chain Snatching	1456	1541	6%	1938	26%	1618	-17%	1269	-22%
Thefts[4]	6124	6100	0%	5892	-3%	5763	-2%	5578	-3%
Vehicles Stolen	3837	4059	6%	3909	-4%	4384	12%	4016	-8%

*Source:*Report on State of Policing and Law and Order in Mumbai, PRAJA, 2013, Pg.20

The table above shows three interesting patterns in the contemporary city-

- There has been a significantly high rise in recorded crimes against women
- There has been a drop in recorded numbers of petty crimes such as thefts, chain snatching, and stealing vehicles
- There has been a reductionin the recorded number murders

These patterns suggest that Mumbai is becoming less violent, excepting in the sharp rise in the number of reported crimes against women. On the other hand, it could suggest a deeper change in the structure and nature of offences. Is

crime becoming more organised and selective? Are particular types of crimes being reported more, while others are under-reported due to social and other barriers? Are offences against particular groups on the rise? How does violence impact particular groups as victims, targets, or as perpetrators? Is violence operating through new and different mechanisms, and who are the actors involved? We now review particular constellations of violence that have been specific to Mumbai.

Organized crime: From the lovable goonda[21] to international terror

The rise of various gangs in the underworld of Mumbai tells a parallel story of the contours of transformation in the city. The contours of illegal activities extend from money laundering, smuggling, narcotics and arms trade, contract killings, and extortion. However, several of these gangs also have an active public face, with economic interests particularly in the sectors of construction and real estate, films, hotels, and the cable business. While the choice of these industries is an indication of the growth drivers in the city; they also indicate how organized crime groups operated through and maintained local (such as,the cable business), regional, and international links (such as, films and the hotels sectors), to the flow of goods, capital, and other resources. Studies have shown how these groups used their influence, leveraged their muscle power, and deployed direct violence or the threat of violence (through murders, beatings, kidnappings, gang wars, and the destruction of property and goods). While initially these criminal networks would provide their services toa particular client, a political leader, or business man, they eventually moved on to starting businesses on their own. They were feared and loved and respected at the same time because they offered protection, jobs, and charity, and mediated for services. There are others who have had an active public life. Thus, Haji Mastan, Arun Gawli, and Chota Rajan's brother have been active in politics. This is indicative to some extent to the degree of political support given to these people and their activities, and the use of political power by these criminal elements to gain a foot hold in the socio-economic structures of the city.

The strategic geography of the city—the relatively unprotected western coast, its proximity to ports in Pakistan, and the transport links to the rest of the world—made it an ideal transit point for cultivating international links and deploying these links to strengthen the network of local activities. Apart from the overt use of the violence that the organised crime groups have employed to gain an upper hand in the city, there was also the presence of international capital that became evident via the involvement of criminal gangs in real estate, films, and so on. However, it was economic liberalisation and the emergence of more porous national boundaries that encouraged local organised crime to enter international exchanges and circuits of capital. Today, these organised crime groups have been able to develop a foothold in the different metropolitan development and urban renewal schemes,which have been undertaken by the government in an effort to make Mumbai a world class city. The city's major OCGs have effectively utilized violence, threats, and bribes to secure permits and overcome regulatory barriers, whereas developers without such clout may have faced resistance to their development projects. One strong example is the development of Vasai-Virar that has been mentioned in one of the sections above. Entire communities were antagonised, as the underworld started forcing its way into the formal processes of the real estate industry. These criminal entities not only have affiliations with national level political parties, but have now started controlling the provision of the basic services in the region.[22]

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[21]   Thug or bully who is involved in illegal activities

[22]   From an interview with an MLA in Vasai-Virar region (2014)

The U.S. Task Force Report of 1967 described organised crime as "a society that seeks to operate outside the control of the American people and their government. It involves thousands of criminals working within structures as complex as those of any large corporation, subject to laws more tightly enforced than those of legitimate governments. Its actions are not impulsive but the result of intricate conspiracies, carried on over whole fields of activity in order to amass huge profits",cited in Sarkar and Tiwari (2002). The operation of the Mumbai underworld illustrates this. The gangs provided a parallel society for youth, especially from particular communities and neighbourhoods trapped in poverty and lacking employment opportunities, an avenue to revel in power, albeit for a short time. Saraf's (1999) study of organized crime in Mumbai in 1995 reveals the following features of a typical gangster—he is within the age group of 19-28 years, has secondary level education, is likely to be a migrant from outside Maharashtra, and often poor.The study further reveals that gangs have a loose confederate structure, with networks of small and large gangs, and organise people into 'in- people' and 'auxiliaries' (ibid). The structure is complex, and has visible and invisible components as well as legal and illegal fronts. The profile of the gangs in Mumbai till 1993 was reputedly secular with several Hindu recruits in Dawood's gang, and similarly many Muslim recruits in Hindu gangs (Zaidi, Sarkar, 2012). The bomb blasts of 1993, and the reported involvement of Dawood, a gang leader in the same, created a deep communal rift in the city's underworld. These rifts have deepened through the dependence of Dawood for protection from his hosts who are ostensibly global terrorist organizations, creating turbulence in the underworld. These developments have also meant that violence or the threat of violence in the city is now being shaped by scales that stretch well beyond the local and into the global.

Riots: From local to a fusion with international terror ?

The first communal clash in Bombay was recorded in 1851 between Parsi and Muslim communities, when the Chitra Dynan Darpan newspaper, which was owned by a Parsi, printed a depiction of Prophet Muhammad and his history. Despite the arrest of 85 people, riots continued for a few days and Bhendi Bazar, which housed a significantly large number of Muslim families, was under siege. Another violent clash was recorded between Parsis and Muslims in February 1857, which was linked to the Broach riots. Two Parsis were killed in this riot. Again in 1874, when Rustomji Hormusji Jalbhoy published details of the Prophet Mohammed in the publication called, "Famous Prophets and Communities", there were violent clashes reported between the Parsi and Muslim communities (Bombay Gazetteer, 2009).

The year1893 witnessed the first major Hindu verses Muslim riot in Bombay. About 100 people were killed and 800 wounded in two weeks of carnage. All businesses in the city was suspended for nearly 10 days, and 50,000 people, chiefly women and children, fled from Bombay to their homes up-country. There was enormous loss of property. Around 1500 people were arrested for rioting and robbery. The later part of the nineteenth century and the early part of twentieth century witnessed many clashes in the city between the Shia and Sunni sects, on the occasion of Muharram, forcing thecolonial administration to ban Muharram processions from 1908 to 1922. Such sporadic rioting continued to be the feature of the city till the 1940s, when such violence also became linked to political violence with the riot in 1945-1946 taking place in the backdrop of the standoff between the All India Congress Committee and the Muslim League. It claimed at least 262 lives, and 791 were injured (Menon, 2010).

One of the most serious communal riots between Hindus and Muslims took place in the post-independence era in the year 1992-1993. Close to a thousand people were killed in these riots, which were seen as a major fracturing point in the social fabric of the city. Even though the city had witnessed riots in the past, the communal violence experienced in the aftermath of the Babri Masjid demolitions in 1991 left the city deeply divided. This not only disrupted the social fabric of the city, but also spatially reorganised it, whereby the lower and middle class Muslims were pushed either to living in ghettos or on the outskirts of the city (Menon, 2012).

While there is no systematic data available on the incidence of riots from independence onwards, available reports suggest that the incidences of riots continued to be localized, episodic, and confined to certain pockets. Besides Hindu-Muslim riots, there have also been cases of riots between Dalits and Hindus. Certain parts of central Mumbai like Kamathipura, suburbs like Jogeshwari, and towns in the metropolitan region like Bhiwandi have been riot endemic (Menon,2012).The triggers in many cases happen to be defilation of community symbols or harm caused to a member of a particular community by another. Analysis of such incidents (Engineer, 2005) suggests that the intensity of these incidents gradually rose, and they became more organized, with the involvement of political parties. A study by YUVA (1996) suggests that over the years, there have been systematic attempts to fragment people by space, to facilitate the mobilisation of particular communities for electoral and other purposes. A particular geography of violence and exclusion is thus unfolding in the city, which is dividing people and places.

The riots changed the form and nature of communal clashes. Further, they have given way to a discourse on terror. The following table traces the various incidents of 'terror' that the city has experienced after the riots.

The discourse on terror fused the relationship between riots as episodes of violence between groups and organized crime. It is reported that organized criminal gangs split on the basis of religion, over the issue of terror (Sharan, 2010). Further, the discourse on terror brought attention to the international links of local happenings, and the city's vulnerability to violent incursions of the same in its space. More importantly, the terror discourse etched the Muslim youth as a figure prone to committing acts of violence and terror, and contributed to the perpetuation of a cycle of multiple exclusions discussed later.

Figure 28: **Various occurrences of 'terror' in the city**

March 12, 1993	August, 28, 1997	January, 24, 1998	February 27, 1998	December 2, 2002
• 13 Blasts across the city; 257 Killed, 713 Injured	• Near Jama Masjid; 0 Killed, 3 Injured	• Malad; 0 Killed 1 Injured	• Virar; 9 Killed, 0 Injured	• Ghatkopar; 3 Killed, 31 Injured

December 6, 2002	January, 27, 2003	March, 13, 2003	April, 14, 2003	July, 29, 2003
• Mumbai Central Railway station; 0 Killed, 25 Injured	• Vileparle; 1 Killed, 25 Injured	• Mulund Railway Station; 11 Killed, 80 Injured	• Bandra; 1 Killed, 0 Injured	• Ghatkopar; 3 Killed, 34 Injured

August, 25, 2003	July, 11, 2006	November, 26, 2008	July, 13, 2011
• Gateway of India and Zaveri Bazaar; 50 Killed, 150 Injured	• 7 Blasts at seven local trains in the city; 181 Killed, 890 Injured	• Multiple terrorist attacks across the city; 166 Killed, 300 Killed	• Serial Blasts across the city; 18 Killed, 131 Injured

Source: http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/database/mumbai_blasts.htm

Muslim demonisation

As Rowena Robinson writes, "Categorized as 'Other', taunted as Pakistani if not vilified as terrorist, the Muslim in India today is an anonymous and frightening figure. Fear and anonymity are, of course, crucial to the maintenance of cultures of hostility and violence"(Robinson, 2005: 23). The demonisation of Muslims in the city is related to a global Islamophobic climate in which Muslims are seen as terrorists and violent and bad citizens. These perceptions that have far-reaching consequences, serve to normalise and legitimise the violence and inequality that many Muslims face in their everyday lives, whether in terms of applying for a job, buying or renting a house, or getting a loan from a bank (Jha and Shajahan, 2010).

Crime involves a significant dimension of labelling by society, and evidently involves an expression of power. Certain people are criminalised and spaces are stigmatised, resulting in physical and mental exclusion and 'othering'. Spaces in the city like Mumbra, Shivaji Nagar, and Bhendi Bazaar, bear testament to the 'othering' processes in the city, where there is heavy surveillance but little provision of basic services (Jha and Shajahan, 2010). These spaces have become known as areas where many Muslims resettled in the wake of the riots in the winter of 1992-1993, an event which changed the socio-spatial fabric of the city through a process of segregation and ghettoisation. In these impoverished neighbourhoods, where families are housed in dense illegal structures that are cut off from employment opportunities, the number of police stations has increased dramatically since the riots and there are daily police patrols (Contractor, 2012). Here, arresting Muslim youth and "linking Muslims to bomb blasts is said to be the most favourite occupation of the Police as also the organizations of the Saffron outfit" (Jha and Shajahan, 2010: 15). The encounter killing of IshratJahan, a young woman from Mumbra (Rao, 2011) and the countless other alleged encounter killings, all bear witness to this.

The decades since the riots have witnessed a rise of Hindu nationalism, which has hardened negative attitudes towards Muslims and the way spaces in which they live in the city are seen. A study in Mumbai found that non-Muslim respondents perceived Muslim men to be oppressive and violent, while Muslim women were seen as helpless victims (Khan, 2007). The study also noted that areas in which Muslims stayed, such as Dongri and Bhendi Bazaar, were also thought of to be unsafe (Khan, 2007).

The devious role of the media and the state in furthering the rhetoric of 'dangerous,' deviant Muslims is an important narrative in this. There is a kind of "black journalism" that now exists, which "ignores good aspects and denigrates people and localities" (Jha and Shajahan, 2010: 18). The sensationalisation and construction of Mumbra and BhendiBazaaar in the news as spaces that are steeped in crime and anomie,is evidence of this trend.

Violence against women: The price of progress?

The U.N. Habitat report on the State of Women in Cities 2012-2013 reflects two main ideas about urbanisation. First, cities are associated with the generation of wealth. Second, urban women enjoy greater social, economic, and political opportunities and freedoms than their rural counterparts (U.N. Habitat Report, 2013). According to McIlwaine (2013), cities can provide women with greater opportunities to cope with violence more effectively in terms of tolerance, access to economic resources, and institutional support.

However, on the other hand, social relations can be more fragmented, which can lead to greater incidence of violence as can the pressures of urban living, such as poverty, engagement in certain types of occupation, poor quality living conditions, and the physical configuration of urban areas (ibid). Urbanization creates risk factors which make women more vulnerable to violence, and at same time it provides more opportunity to combat it.

There are many triggers for violence against women, which are rooted in patriarchal notions. One of the triggers related to the urban area is the urban spaces and the nature of the activities that occur there, which can increase the likelihood of women experiencing gender-based violence. Another trigger can be the intersections between social, economic, and institutional changes, and fluid gender identities, which might loosen strict patriarchal structures. In this, violence against women can increase or decrease depending on how the society accepts this loosening of structures. Given the general state of gender discrimination in the country and the overall tacit condoning of varied forms of violence within the four walls of the home as well as outside, violence against women is defined more by silence than by expression and reporting. Thus, social development and urbanisation are expected to have a vexed relationship with an increase in violence and crimes against women. Violence against women can take many forms including dowry deaths, rape, widow immolation (sati), child marriage, female infanticide and foeticide, forced prostitution including temple prostitution, 'eve-teasing' or sexual harassment in public places in the form of lewd remarks, pinching, pawing, and so on, and pornography. According to available statistics from around the globe, one out of every three women has experienced violence in an intimate relationship at some point in her life. This is an average based on available national surveys across industrialised and developing countries (World Health Organization, 1997). Statistical evidence on the actual prevalence of domestic violence in India is scant, however, due to lack of reporting owing to prevailing gender norms and fear among the victims and their families. The few studies available indicate that physical abuse of Indian women is quite high, ranging from 22- 60 per cent of women surveyed (Rao, 1996; Mahajan, 1990). In the context of the city, the crime statistics in Table 1(cited earlier) from 2007-2012 reflect a sharp increase in the incidence of violent crimes against women. These largely include rape and molestation.

As per the statistics of the Mumbai Railway Police, there has been an increase of almost 80 per cent in sexual harassment cases against women in Mumbai locals in 2013, compared to 2012. Molestation cases rose from 21 in 2012 to 42 in 2013.

How do women and girls engage and participate in the city's public spaces? Do they engage with it to the same extent as men? According to Phadke et al (2011), women and girls are not able to exercise their rights to the city and its spaces fully due to prevailing gender norms that shape their interactions by curtailing mobility and labelling them as 'good and bad', or 'moral and immoral'. These norms are very much prevalent in the process of city planning that does not pay attention to the unique and specific needs and concerns of women and girls such as clean and safe public toilets, sufficient street lights, safe and inclusive public spaces, and transport. While women overall face problems in accessing the city that they consider theirs, Dalit and Muslim women experience intersecting vulnerabilities on account of their gender, caste, and religion.

The last few decades have seen many changes in gender relationships, including the closing of the gap in educational status and wages, and increasing number of women joining the formal work force. For many, these changes are symptomatic of growing modernisation. These have threatened traditional patriarchal notions about circumscribed gender roles. This, in turn, has given rise to newer kinds of violence, such as acid attacks and gang rapes, which can be seen as reactionary assertions on women's bodies and sexualities. Violence in public spaces induces fear among

women, girls, and their families, which results in the restriction of mobility, fear of public spaces, and restricted participation in the city. Phadke et al (2011) locate the safety of women within the overall notion of inclusion and access to city spaces.

Criminalisation of the poor

Slums and other sites of poverty have always been sites of violence. Denied adequate opportunities to access the city, the poor are compelled to live their lives in an ethos of illegality. Their livelihoods and the sites employed for the same are considered as a nuisance and often downright illegal. Their claims over land too are considered illegal, and hence the access to basic services is also through a frame of illegality (Fernandes and Varley, 1998).In Mumbai,a city that can be considered one that has learnt to tolerate the presence of the poor (given that more than half the city stays in slums), the legal framework around slums and the poor has not significantly changed. On one hand, accommodation has been extended through the introduction of the Slum Act, but on the other hand, the penalising provisions in the police and municipal acts have also been retained. Governmentality has thus been characterised by a plethora of responses, where eviction and clearance form as much of the state's repertoire, as tolerance and improvement (Bhide andDabir, 2008;Weinstein 2008). Further, given that slums have been considered to be dens of crime in operational terms, slums and the streets have always been sites of exertion of power by the state in the form of police, encroachment squads, and the like. Youth in the slums are much more likely to be picked up during routine vigilance rounds.

In recent years, there have been modifications in laws that have particularly vitiated this trend of criminalisation. The modifications in the Slum Act in 2002, for example, have converted encroachment into a non-bailable crime, with a minimum punishment of three years imprisonment. This modification also penalises the officials, but it is significant to note that in the last 12 years of implementation of the act, no complaint has been registered against any official as per this act; on the other hand, several slum dwellers have been prosecuted. Similarly, refusal to cooperate with redevelopment has been converted into an offence that could result in permanent denial of the benefit of rehabilitation. It has also been observed that the legal provisions under municipal and police acts that have existed since colonial times are now being invoked as a regular practice. Criminalisation, has thus emerged as an active threat to inclusion.

The city has witnessed a spate of crimes against women in recent times. It is interesting to note that recent media reportage and system response is more focused around cases where such crimes are committed against women from the middle or upper classes, and the crime has been perpetrated by youth from slums. On the other hand, crimes against poor women are regularly ignored by media, and the response by security systems is knee-jerk and perfunctory. This reveals a class and urban bias on media reportage as well as sate response.

Conclusion

The review of the transforming city indicates that violence is embedded in the very way the city has developed and in its various transformations. Violence has been used as an instrument by the state as well as by the marginalised groups to stake claims upon the city. Yet, throughout the colonial period and through the change of the millennium, Mumbai was largely seen as a safe city. At the turn of the nineteenth century, the order in the city was threatened by 'outbreak' of large-scale urban riots during the 1890s, in conjunction with the rapid growth of an unregulated, proletarian 'secondary economy', and public culture centred on the 'street'. These threats led to a re-examination of the security response, by the colonial state.

The city is currently at the threshold of another multi-layered transformation. Some of the manifestations of the most recent transformations are seen in terms of fragmented social relations, a constant instability through migration and loss of livelihoods, a mismatch in economic drivers and capabilities, a political system that places high weightage on numbers, a shadow and upfront collusion with market, and extremely high commoditisation of space that seems to engulf every nook and corner. It is a society that is becoming more iniquitous and losing its previous communitarian bonds—a society that is not just vulnerable, but also precarious. The transformations in the city are currently being driven by changes at multiple scales—local, national, regional, and global. Conventional security responses through enhanced policing may not prove adequate in managing the turbulence caused.

The city aspires to a world-class city status, but as the account reveals, it remains at heart a third world city with significant levels of poverty and inequality, and is likely to be so for some time to come. The inequality in the city has now taken on a spatial form and is being reproduced at a metropolitan scale. Mumbai has low crime statistics and continues to be statistically safe but the real question is—is it safe for everyone? What are the implications when groups are systematically marginalised, criminalised, and pushed into vicious and accelerating cycles of violence? The city has learnt to produce order in the backdrop of an 'ineffective state in terms of deliverance' through a substantive part of the post-independence period (Rao, 2000). This is what has led to the public experience and perception of safety. This perception is rapidly changing to an image of a 'city at risk' (Appadurai, 2000; Rao, 2000).The incidents of terror and reported crime have produced fear, and in a self-providing society, have given rise to the 'privatisation' of security and surveillance.

What are the prospects of collectively rediscovering a notion of safety that is founded in inclusivity? Or is the city condemned to a future that brings in a world class status while simultaneously allowing for vulnerability to terror?

Appendix 1:

Some major projects that are under progress / proposed by MCGM include:

Metro system proposals in MCGM – The master plan for Metro system includes a total of 7 corridors with an aggregate length of 146.5 kms. The Phase I (3 corridors) is under implementation and is being taken up on PPP, with the private partner bringing in the capital investment. Phase II (2 corridors planned between 2011-16) and Phase III (4 corridors planned between 2016-21) are proposed. The Metro system is estimated to cost about Rs. 33,550 Crore, with almost all stretches expected to be on PPP model. The Metro projects are being handled by MMRDA.

Mumbai Urban Transport Project (Road Component) – Under MUTP, major east-west links have been proposed in addition to other road based projects at a total cost of Rs. 1,016 Crore (2001 prices) (including projects, studies, monitoring, traffic management plan, etc).

1. **Mumbai Urban Transport Project (MUTP):** It is a project for mass transportation and has three components namely Rail, Road and Resettlement and Rehabilitation of Project affected people. Estimated cost: Rs.4,526crores. This project has been partly funded by the World Bank.

2. **Mumbai Urban Infrastructure Project (MUIP):** This project is meant to supplement the MUTP, with the main objective of road network improvements on all the Development Plan roads and efficient traffic dispersal system in the city. Estimated cost: Rs.2,648crores. It is a State Government venture.

3. **BandraWorli Sea Link Project:** This is an ambitious project envisaged in two phases (a) From Bandra to Worli and (b) from Worli to Nariman Point. This link will also form part of the western freeway. Estimated cost: Rs. 1,306 crores. This is a State Government project.

4. **Metro Rail Transport System Project:** Versova - Andheri – Ghatkopar Corridor. This is the first Mass Rapid Transport System project in India being implemented on Public Private Partnership (PPP) format. The project will be competed in 3 phases-Phase I - (2006-2011), Phase II - (2011-2016), and Phase III - (2016-2021). Total length will be 146.5 km. Estimated Cost: Rs.19, 525 crore.

5. **Mono Rail:** Monorail is envisaged as a feeder network to mass transit system; it occupies very limited space on ground; can negotiate sharp turns and can climb up and down steep gradients easily. Implementation of about 20km stretch from SantGadgeMaharajChowk (Jacob circle)-Wadala - Chembur with 18 stations as pilot project is under construction.

6. **Mumbai Trans Harbour Link (MTHL):** This will be an eight-lane (two-way, four-lane) 22.5 km bridge connecting Sewri in South Mumbai to NhavaSheva in Navi Mumbai. The State Government is currently looking for bidders for this project.

7. **Dedicated Bus lanes on major arterial roads** - Bus Rapid Transport System (BRTS). Estimated cost: Rs.40 crores. The project still has not been finalized. However, dedicated bus lanes will be seen on Santacruz Chembur Link Road, JogeshwariVikhroli Link Road, Eastern and Western Express Highways as part of the MUTP project.

8. **Wadala Truck Terminal:** The basic objective of developing the Truck Terminal is to decongest South Mumbai by shifting the existing transport companies offices and godowns, which are today concentrated in B & C Wards in south Mumbai causing severe traffic congestion. It will also help to rationalize the movement of truck traffic on the city roads. The truck terminal is being developed progressively in four phases to accommodate 3000 trucks at a time.

8. **Inter State Bus Terminus:** Six Ha. of land will be used in the Wadala Truck Terminal for an Inter State Bus Terminus for long distance buses and their passengers. Estimated cost: Rs.200/- crores.

9. **Fifteen New Flyovers:** As a continuation of the 50 flyovers project which was commissioned by the Shiv Sena - BJP government in the 1990's, the Congress Government has set out to build 15 more flyovers, 8 in the western suburbs and 5 on Dr.Ambedkar Road. In addition, there is an ambitious plan to construct elevated roads.

10. **Ferry Services:** Ferry services are going to be reintroduced to ease traffic congestion. Thirteen proposals have been received, of which 8 have been cleared. They will ply from South Mumbai to Thane and New Bombay and from Borivali to Nariman Point.

11. **Santacruz - Chembur link:** the 6.5 –km double deck flyover is under construction, would reduce journey from Santacruz to Chembur to 17 minutes.

12. **Andheri-Ghatkopar link:** the 7.9 km road connects the Western Express Highway in Andheri to Ghatkopar via Saki Naka and Asalpha.

13. **Elevated Link from Sewri to Worli Sea Link**: The proposed elevated road link intends to connect the areas between MTHL interchange and Worli Sea Link and is expected to ensure rapid connectivity between the main land and the Western Suburbs.

14. **Coastal Road (West):** Joint Technical Committee (JTC), Govt. of Maharashtra has proposed access controlled Coastal Road along the western coast from Nariman point to Malad 35.60 km long, with interchanges at 18 locations connecting to other major roads. The JTC proposes two options. The first involves reclaimed roads in the mangrove areas, while allowing free movement of water in the mangroves by bridges. The second option is to replace the reclaimed roads by stilted or elevated roads in a length of about 8 km. The proposed coastal road is expected to provide high-speed connectivity to Western Suburbs and South Mumbai.

15. **Elevated Corridor**: Additional elevated rail corridor from Oval Maidan to Virar has been proposed by the Western Railway to be implemented in the PPP mode, in order to cater to the large passenger volumes in this route.

(Adapted from Staking a Claim, 2010, p.42-43)

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